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TOWARDS A PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE:
BASIC INSIGHTS AND CONCEPTS
Samuel . M. Donnelly*
I. INTRODUCTION**
In my youth, Roscoe Pound offered me what I then thought was a
profound insight about law; I still perceive it as a very wise comment.
During a conversation in his office he said: "'Some think that law is
economics, and there is a great deal to be said for this; others think
that law is ethics; and some think that law is social engineering. They
are all wrong. Law is all of these.' "I During Pound's youth, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., had argued that the life of the law is not logic
but experience. 2 Since then, as David Granfield contended recently in
The Inner Experience of Law, a Jurisprudence of Subjectivity, Ameri-
can jurisprudence has been about the piecemeal recovery of a role for
the person in law? It also has been about the forms of legal reason-
ing. A principal theme of this Article is that law is primarily about
persons and their relationships.
* A.B., Fordham University, LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., New York Univer-
sity. Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. Member of the New York and
New Jersey Bars. The Author wishes to thank Sandeep Qusba and Ellen Conway for their
invaluable assistance in preparing the footnotes and for other research assistance on this
Article.
** Each reader is invited while reading this Article to enter the conversation and to
experiment mentally by examining his or her own intellectual and legal method. Readers
engaged in this exercise may imagine themselves as judges. While this Article often refers
to the judge as he, that pronoun generically refers to both men and women. A woman
judge engaged in introspective reflection on her judicial method would refer to herself as
she. The male author of this Article engaged in a similar exercise would refer to himself as
he. Readers engaged in reflecting on their own intellectual method should substitute the
appropriate pronoun. The crossing of horizons recommended by this Article would
require one to recognize the different use of pronouns by different readers and perhaps to
imagine oneself using the different pronoun.
1. Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Book Review, 3 HoFsRA L. REv. 899, 915 (1975) (review-
ing WILLIAM TWmING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIsT MovEMENT (1973) and
DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1973)) [hereinafter Donnelly,
HorsmA Book Review].
2. OLIVER W. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1963) [hereinafter
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW].
3. Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Book Review, 36 AM. J. JuRis. 239, 241 (1991) (reviewing
DAVID GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW, A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJEcrIv-
rry (1988)) [hereinafter Donnelly, AM. J. JuRis. Book Review].
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This Article is an attempt to contribute a series of related in-
sights, which could be described as a theory of personalism, to the
current discussions about law. In recent years Alan Gewirth offered a
theory of personalism full of valuable insights but developed differ-
ently than the discussion in this Article.4 Margaret Radin, working
within the context of feminism and pragmatism, has also presented
valuable personalist thoughts to the ongoing conversation about law.5
Yet a rich vein of European personalist thought has been mined only
sparsely for valuable contributions to American legal thought. The
insights in this Article are to some extent influenced by Bernard Hdir-
ing6 and in particular ways, especially in the theory of the common
good offered below, by the work of Karol Wojtyla in The Acting Per-
son.7 The principal nonlegal background for this Article, however, is
4. See ALAN GwmTH, REASON .AND MORALITY (1978).
5. Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SocEry 127 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
6. See BERNARD HARING, FREE AND FAITHFUL IN CiRIsT 77, 82-83 (1978). Hlring
states:
One of the essential words and concepts of today's German theology and
culture is Mitmenschlichkeit, which could be translated as "co-humanity". We re-
alize our full humanity in all its dimensions and potentialities insofar as we hon-
our and promote the same humanity in our fellowmen.
Our leitmotif, "free and faithful in Christ", calls not so much for a metaphysi-
cal approach in view of the abstract "being" as for a personalistic and communal
approach. One of the main perspectives, therefore, is healthy relationships with
God, with fellowmen, with one's self and with all of creation. The whole of doc-
trine is to be seen explicitly in view of salvation, wholeness of persons and of
fostering families, communities and societies of responsible persons.
See generally BERNARD HARING, Being-a-Person in Word and Love, in THE CHRISTIAN
EXISTENTIALT 10-11 (1968) [hereinafter HARING, THE CHRISnAN EXiSTENTALIsT]
(Deems Lectures delivered at New York University in 1966), where Haring summarizes:
The self of man in the lonely crowd often experiences the deepest self-es-
trangement, frustration, and lack of self-communication from which abstract
thought and a materially oriented knowledge is totally incapable to free him.
Modem psychology recognizes ipsation ... as a severe illness, a sign of man's
immaturity. Ipsation represents man's incapacity for genuine human communica-
tion and, in short, his inability to emerge from himself in a genuinely human man-
ner....
iModem personalism, as represented by such philosophers and theologians as
Ferdinand Ebner, Martin Buber, Max Scheler, Emil Mounier, Gabriel Marcel,
heodor Steinbuchel, Romano Guardini, Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, Richard Niebuhr, is a personalism of encounter and community in
word and love.
7. KAROL WorryLA, THE ACI7ING PERSON (Anna-Teresa lymieniecka ed. & Andrzej
Potocki trans., 1979).
[Vol. 28:547
PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE
a melding of the thought of Bernard Lonergan8 and John
Macmurray. 9  -
Bernard Lonergan-in Insight: A Study of Human -Understand-
ing, a philosophical work, and Method in Theolbgy-offers an under-
standing of general intellectual method as well as an analysis of a
series of existing methodologies, including the scientific, the mathe-
matical, and the historical. He describes a number of these, including
the historical, as specialized commonsense methods. He describes
commonsense method as the self-correcting process of learning
through living.'" Lonergan's development of a general intellectual
method from multiple particular methods, and his commonsense
method offer a number of important insights into law. He probably
would classify law among the specialized commonsense methods. In
Insight, Lonergan encourages the reader to participate in his explora-
tion through an introspective analysis of our own intellectual
method." As will be argued later, introspective analysis of a judge's
intellectual method implies that the judge is a person, a subject, whose
subjectivity is worth examining. A judge who understands himself as
a subject more readily recognizes that those with whom he deals are
also persons or subjects.' 2 Lonergan offers a way to reflect on the
minds of judges, and hence, on judges as persons and to relate legal
decision-making method and law to that reflection.'
3
John Macmurray-in The Self As Agent,'4 that is as one who acts,
and Persons in Relation"5-has developed a theory of persons in rela-
tion to each other through action. Although Lonergan's thought has
many personalist aspects, including his important discussion of con-
8. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT- A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (3d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter LONERGAN, INSIGHT]; BERNA91D J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THE-
OLOoY (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter LoNERGAN, MTmHOD IN THEOLOGY].
9. JOHN MACMURRAY, THE SELF AS AGENT (1957) [hereinafter MACMURRAY, THE
SELF AS AGENT] (volume I of Professor Macmurray's Gifford Lectures given under the
title THE Foxm OF THE PERSONAL); JoN MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION (1961)
[hereinafter MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATIoN] (volume 2 of Professor Macmurray's
Gifford Lectures given under the title THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL).
10. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 44, 396-98, 425; DAVID TRACY, THE
ACHmVEm"NT OF BERNARD LoNERGAN 104-32 (1970).
11. See LONERoAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at xix.
12. See Donnelly, AM. J. JURIS. Book Review, supra note 3, at 242.
13. See TRACY, supra note 10, at 133-44; Samuel J. M. Donnelly, Principles, Persons,
and Horizons: A Friendly Analysis of What Dworkin Has Overlooked, 26 ST. Louis U.
LJ. 217, 254-65 (1982) [hereinafter Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons].
14. See MACMURRAY, THE SELF AS AGENT, supra note 9.
15. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9.
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version in Method in Theology,16 Macmurray offers a more fully per-
sonalist understanding of the individual in relation to others and to
society.' 7 Lonergan's analysis of intellectual method, when used to
develop an understanding of the judge's decision-making process, al-
lows us to apply Macmurray's personalist theory and insights to law.
The judge may be understood as one who acts through judicial deci-
sions in relation to others.18 An examination of a judge's decision-
making method is an examination of his action as a person in relation
to other persons and to society, which could be considered one mode
of persons acting together.
In The Inner Experience of Law, A Jurisprudence of Subjectiv-
ity,19 David Granfield applies'Lonergan's insights and method to law
and takes the first steps towards melding his thought with the grand
conversation of American jurisprudence.2w Following the path broken
by Granfield and continuing the development of Lonergan's thought
as applied to law is an easier task because of a series of developments
in American jurisprudence over the last century. Among these are
the piecemeal recovery of a role for the person in law, noted by Gran-
field, 2  and the focus of American jurisprudential thought on the
judge's decision-making process. 2 The American legal realists in par-
ticular have begun the introspective analysis of the judge's decision-
making method23-an exploration continued to some extent by the
critical legal studies movement and other postmodern approaches to
law.24
A major dilemma for personalist thought posed by the current
stage of the grand conversation of American jurisprudence is the ap-
parent incompatibility between decisions grounded in strong princi-
ples reflecting important ideals and decisions grounded in contextual
16. See LONERGAN, METMOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 237-47, 267-69.
17. See MAcmuRRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9.
18. See Donnelly, Am. J. Juis. Book Review, supra note 3, at 243-45.
19. Id.
20. See id at 240,251; see also SAMUEL J. M. DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES
OF RIGH-rs (1994) (explaining theory of grand conversation of legal philosophy in twenti-
eth century) [hereinafter DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS].
21. See Donnelly, AM. J. JURIS. Book Review, supra note 3, at 241.
22. Id at 243-45.
23. See Donnelly, HOFSTRA Book Review, supra note 1, at 911-12; see also Donnelly,
Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 226-37 (discussing situation sense as
method of judicial decision making).
24. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phe-
nomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); cf Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A
Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985) (demonstrating
how reader's preconceptions of gender affect understanding of law casebook).
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decision making. Ronald Dworkin's insistence on principled decisions
ultimately justified by equal respect and concern for all persons has
great appeal for personalist thought? 5 Nevertheless it is difficult to
relate adequately and do justice to real persons without contextual
decision making; decision making that concerns the relationships be-
tween persons in particular situations.26
This Article, then, is an attempt to contribute insights to the
grand conversation of American jurisprudence by further melding
personalist thought with the piecemeal recovery of the person in law
and with the continuing discussions of the judicial decision-making
process.
The next segment of the Article, Part 11,27 continues this brief
introduction to personalist thought by presenting a central concept,
the person-or the judge-as one who acts, and discussing the clarifi-
cation which that concept offers to jurisprudence. Part III, traces
briefly the recovery of a role for the person in American reflections
on law. One important moment in that recovery was the legal realist
discovery of "insight" which Karl Llewellyn called "hunching" or "sit-
uation sense" 29 and Jerome Frank described as the "gestalt." 0 That
vital moment in introspective reflection on judicial and intellectual
method is discussed in Part IV,31 which lays a foundation for further
discussion and a personalist critique of method in Part V.32 Reflection
on intellectual and legal method, both in Lonergan's work and in
much postmodern thought, encounters our own limited knowledge
and understanding and the contextual situatedness of our thought, a
phenomenon which Lonergan describes as horizons.33 Part VI 4 dis-
cusses horizons in intellectual and legal method and examines the ex-
periences which Lonergan describes as crossing and transcending
horizons.? Principles, ideologies, and fundamental theories must be
perceived, as argued in Part VII, within the context of horizons but
25. RoNAtao DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 198, 206-07 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPiRE]; RONAW DWORKIN, TAKING RIGITrS SERIOUSLY 178-81 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
26. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 258-63.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 44-65.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 66-77.
29. See Donnelly, HOSTRA Book Review, supra note 1, at 906-11.
30. Id. at 909.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 78-105.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 106-43.
33. See TRAcY, supra note 10, at 12-21, 104-32.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 144-86.
35. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 254-65.
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also as related to commitment to persons. In personalist thought,
commitment to persons is central but it requires us not merely to an-
nounce, and perhaps logically develop, that commitment but also to
listen to and attempt to understand persons in the context of their
concrete circumstances and situations. 36 Commitment to principles,
then, must be accompanied by a commitment to cross horizons in an
effort to listen to and understand persons.
3 7
With that background understanding of the role of principles and
theories, it is possible, in Part VIII,38 to offer a personalist theory of
the common good which must be developed, as argued in Part IX,39 in
a pluralist society; a society composed of multiple horizons, through
conversation with others across horizons.40 Parts II through IX could
be described as an introduction to the basic concepts and insights of
personalism as applied to law. They also present important aspects of
the ideal judge's intellectual search and effort to relate to persons
through law. That search is further described and summarized in Part
X.
4 1
One who is engaged in personalist jurisprudence pursues a similar
search-a search which requires conversation with others, including
the many thinkers who have contributed to recovery of a role for the
person in American law. Personalism is not only committed to deep
respect and concern for each and all persons but is fascinated with all
aspects of human life, particularly with the multiple contexts in which
persons relate to each other.42
This Article offers a theory of personalism in law and an intro-
duction to its basic concepts which must be understood in the context
of that search. It is an effort to contribute insights to the ongoing
conversation about American law and judicial decision-making
method. As is normal in conversation, the reader may find some ap-
pealing insights as well as others that do not fit the reader's under-
standing of law. Lonergan encourages the removal of insights from
one setting and then incorporating them into different theories, under-
36. See Donnelly, HoFs'RA Book Review, supra note 1, at 906-07.
37. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 254-65.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 214-79.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 280-321.
40. See DONNELLY, Tim LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 81-91.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 322-95.
42. See HARING, THE CHmSTIAN EXISTENITALIST, supra note 6; see also MACMURRAY,
PERSONS IN RELA:ION, supra note 9 (discussing structure of personal world and how per-
sonal relations constitute personal existence).
[Vol. 28:547
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standings, and horizons.4' That approach is a useful and normal result
of intellectual conversation. With this concept in mind, the conversa-
tion in this Article begins with a discussion of the person as one who
acts.
II. ACTION
H.L.A. Hart once exclaimed that Americans are all "mad," par-
ticularly when they write about jurisprudence4-they have been
driven mad by the power of the United States Supreme Court.4 5 For
this reason much of American jurisprudential writing in the twentieth
century-unlike Hart's own descriptive analysis-is concerned with
discussing, arguing about, and prescribing methods for judicial deci-
sion making.
The philosophical and religious thinkers, whom in this Article I
will describe as "personalists," would find that American emphasis ap-
propriate. Some leading personalists-for example John Macmur-
ray,46 Alan Gewirth,47 and Karol Wojtyla"-would describe a person
primarily as one who acts. In contrast, a Cartesian understanding
would place the emphasis on thinking.4 9 Reflection, thinking, analy-
sis, and abstract thought in general are important to action; but, as
Gabriel Marcel noted, they are secondary.
50
43. See generally TRACY, supra note 10, at 151-55 (explaining Lonergan's notion of
advancing positions and reversing counterpositions).
44. See H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969, 969-70 (1977).
45. Id.
46. See MACmuRRAY, PERSONS IN RELATiON, supra note 9; MACmuRRAY, THE SELF
AS AGENT, supra note 9.
47. See GEWiRTH, supra note 4.
48. See WorrYLA, supra note 7.
49. See MACMURRAY, THE SELF As AGENT, supra note 9, at 84-103; see also Won-YLA,
supra note 7, at 18-22 ("On the ground of the integrated experience of man, unlike through
the behavioristic approach, the person is revealed through action, because in this experi-
ence man is given us from the inside and not only outwardly."). See generally GEWIRTH,
supra note 4 (claiming that action is necessary to principle of morality).
50. 1 GABRIEL MARCEL, THE MYSTERY OF BEING: REFLECTION & MYSTERY 83
(G.P.S. Fraser trans., 1950-1951); see also KENNETH T. GALLAGHER, THE PmLOSOPHY OF
GABRIEL MARCEL 41-45 (1962) (discussing distinction between primary and secondary re-
flection). It is important to note, however, that we may do violence to our language by
defining all persons as agents that act. As Harry G. Frankfurt pointed out, a callous defini-
tion of the term "person" diminishes our vocabulary and may lead to the neglect of an
important area of inquiry. Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 5-6 (1971). Arguably, the definition of "person" should capture
something unique to the human species, and yet, not be so exclusive that it discounts some
humans (i.e., those in a coma, those with severe brain defects, et cetera). The definition of
January 1995]
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Hart, in a view that is now perhaps out of date, would have de-
fended the old-fashioned distinction between the "is" and the
"ought," between law and morality, for example.51 That distinction
disappears, as is apparent from many American writings, when one
examines law from the perspective of a judge about to decide a case.
The judge's decision is action or conduct subject to moral evaluation.
The judge must determine what ought to be done. One describing the
law or the judge's decisions has a different perspective. Arguably, at
least from the descriptive perspective, the task of describing the is can
be separate from the task of evaluating. However, that separation is
not possible from the perspective of one who acts and decides.
Defining the person as one who acts provides a foundation for
exploring the decision-making method of the judge as one who acts
and decides.52 That perspective, in turn, invites introspective analysis
of the judge's decision-making method, This turn to the subject im-
plies that the judge is a person, a subject. In personalist thought, ac-
tion is an important foundation for intersubjectivity, for interpersonal
relations-persons are related through action.5 3 The judge as a per-
son who acts and decides is related to other persons through his ac-
tions. An important task in American legal theory is to relate abstract
principles grounded, as Dworkin recommends, in friendship or deep
respect and concern for the other, to a more concrete understanding
of human persons acting together in real life situations. 4 The per-
sonalist understanding of the judge as a person in relation to other
persons through his actions and who should appropriate his own deci-
sion-making method through introspective analysis, provides an op-
portunity for exploring the relationship between abstract principles
and concrete interpersonal relations.
Through action, one perceives oneself as a person and the other
as a person. In action, one cannot be isolated; one's action is in rela-
tion to something or someone. One who acts intentionally encounters
a person as an agent who acts, then, is not meant as an all encompassing definition; rather,
it is offered as a clarifying concept in the realm of jurisprudence.
51. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv.
593, 596 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].
52. See Donnelly, AM. J. Jums. Book Review, supra note 3, at 243-45.
53. See MAcmURRAY, PERSONS IN RELAMON, supra note 9, at 11-13; cf. id. at 12 ("For
our present purpose... the result which concerns us especially is that it ends the solitari-
ness of the 'thinking self', sets man firmly in the world which he knows, and so restores
him to his proper existence as a community of persons in relation.").
54. Compare Donnelly, AM. J. JrRus. Book Review, supra note 3, at 245 (emphasizing
concern for human element in law) with DWORKIN, TAKING Rion'rs SERIOUSLY, supra
note 25, at 180 (emphasizing judicial integrity over individual equality).
[Vol. 28:547
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resistance and, hence, perceives an object which resists. In the action
he perceives himself both as a subject, the one who intends the action,
and an object of his action.5 5 Through experiment he discovers that
some resistance is intentional and, hence, the resistance of a subject.
As an actor, then, he perceives himself both as subject and other be-
cause he intends his own action and perceives himself as the object of
another subject. 6 As a subject we can refer to the actor as "I"; and as
an object he is "You. '57 In action, persons are perceived and given
together. There is always an I and a You-two subjects who perceive
each other as acting intentionally although they are objects of each
other's activity. John Macmurray, explaining his emphasis on the Self
as agent or actor rather than as thinker, argues:
In reflection we isolate ourselves from dynamic relations
with the Other; we withdraw into ourselves, adopting the at-
titude of spectators, not of participants. We are then out of
touch with the world, and for touch we must substitute vi-
sion; for a real contact with the Other an imagined contact;
and for real activity an activity of imagination.
We know existence by participating in existence. This
participation is action. When we expend energy to realize an
intention we meet a resistance which both supports and lim-
its us, and know that we exist and that the Other exists, and
that our existence depends upon the existence of the
Other. 8
This is similar to Jean Paul Sartre's description of how one defines
oneself under the Look of the Other.59 Sartre expands this concept to
explain the manner in which a group may define itself.' Labor, for
example, defines itself under the Look of management. World War II
partisans perceive themselves under the Look of the Nazis. In Mac-
murray's view, one perceives oneself as a subject in relation to an-
other subject because of the intentional resistance one encounters to
one's intentional action.
61
55. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 64-85.
56. See id. at 15-43; MACMURRAY, TH-E SELF AS AGENT, supra note 9, at 104-26.
57. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 27-28.
58. See id. at 16-17.
59. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 340-400 (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
1969).
60. I& at 534-56.
61. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 16-17, 79-82.
January 1995]
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The personalist emphasis on action, then, both parallels the
American concern for understanding law from the perspective of the
deciding judge and offers a fruitful foundation for jurisprudential
thought.62 It offers a resolution for the now old-fashioned quarrel
over whether law as it is can be distinguished from law as it ought to
be. In addition, when the judge is perceived as one who acts, he is
seen in personalist thought as a person in relation to others through
his actions.63 As a person capable of introspective reflection, the
judge and those criticizing him properly are concerned with his intel-
lectual method, particularly as explained by his judicial decision-mak-
ing process. Because that process results in action affecting others,
the judge's intellectual method and the criticism of that method is an
important aspect of what Jerome Frank called three-dimensional
law-an understanding of law which perceives a decision maker relat-
ing to a situation and the people in that situation through the language
and rule elementf a' The Tecognition of the judge as a person who acts
avoids the misunderstanding which Frank would have described as flat
law-namely a vision of law which concentrates on the language and
rule element and ignores people and their relationships.65
III. THE RECOVERY OF THE PERSON IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT
David Granfield contends that over the course of the twentieth
century there has been a piecemeal recovery of the person in Ameri-
can legal thought.66 Sociological jurisprudence, open to multiple
human demands and concerned with impact and interest analysis,
could be regarded as humanistically seeking to understand the ef-
fects-either beneficial or oppressive-of law on human beings.
Legal realism, a related school of thought, sought in its early mode to
predict what judges with their multiple quirks and subject to many
influences-political, social, and cultural-would in fact do. To at-
tempt such a prediction is to stumble across judges as human beings.
Lon Fuller emphasized his concern for reciprocal relations between
persons.67 Ronald Dworkin, who criticized Fuller's failure to relate
62. See Donnelly, AM. J. Ju~is. Book Review, supra note 3, at 251.
63. See i at 243-45.
64. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 74, 182-83, 197-98 (1949).
65. Id.
66. See Donnelly, AM. J. JuRis. Book Review, supra note 3, at 239.
67. See LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 73-76 (1968) [hereinafter FULLER,
ANATOMY OF THE LAW].
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PERSONALIST JURISPRUDENCE
his thought to fundamental commitment,6" has offered, in Taking
Rights Seriously and Law's Empire, an interpretation of law and a
method for judicial decision making which is grounded in such funda-
mental principles as affording all persons equal respect and concern.6 9
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, could be understood as grounded in
a similar commitment.7" The critical legal studies movement, with its
many facets and its cast of thousands, claims legal realism as its intel-
lectual ancestor and its object as support for the cause of humanity.71
A major concern is to perceive and attack oppression. James Boyd
White understands law as rhetoric, an ongoing argument about what
society should be which relates persons and constitutes society.
72
Feminist jurisprudence,73 perhaps in the critical legal studies tradition,
wants to break through the establishment structures and bring before
society hidden oppression, or perhaps, to participate in the ongoing
debate, described by White, as to what society should be. Some femi-
nist thought would emphasize the transformation of society to make it
more caring.74 Outsider jurisprudence likewise is concerned with op-
pression and the transformation of society.75
The recovery of the person in twentieth century American juris-
prudence nevertheless has been partial. David Granfield sometimes
describes American thought as perceiving a truncated person, as fo-
68. See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by
Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 668, 673 (1965).
69. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 150-83; DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 180, 195-215.
70. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). For Dworkin's critique and interpre-
tation of Rawls, see DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 150-83.
71. The critical legal studies movement emerged in the late 1970s. Some leaders in this
movement include: Duncan Kennedy, Karl Klare, Morton Horwitz, Mark Thshnet, and
Roberto Unger. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96
HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983); see also Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1984) (discussing critical legal studies movement and its relevance to society); Morton J.
Horwitz, The Bork N6mination and American Constitutional History (Kharas Lecture Se-
ries), 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1027 (1988) (examining constitutional theories involved in
Bork nomination to Supreme Court).
72. See JAMES BOYD WHrm, HERAcLEs' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POET-
ICS OF THE LAW (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES' Bow].
73. See Radin, supra note 5; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 515-44
(1982).
74. See Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gil-
ligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. 1 (1990).
75. Mari J. Matsuda uses the term "outsider" rather than "minority." She does this so
that readers are not gripped by the numerical significance that belies the term "minority."
See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 2320, 2323-24 (1989).
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cusing on aspects of the person rather than attempting to understand
the whole.76 One is reminded of the children's story from India about
four blind men who attempted to describe an elephant. One who felt
the elephant's leg aniounced that it was a log. Another, feeling the
elephant's ear, disagreed and proclaimed it was a fan. A third, who
held the tail, said it was a rope. The fourth, who was exploring the
elephant's body, said it went on and on forever. American jurispru-
dence, in the twentieth century, could be perceived as a series of an-
nouncements, all genuine but partial discoveries, as to what the
elephant is. Each pronouncement contains one important insight or
another into the relation between persons and law.
Because the insights are partial, those who grasp and proclaim
them often are in deep conflict with others who have discovered an-
other aspect of human relations and law. Thus modem jurisprudential
discourse presents a series of conflicts, puzzles, and dilemmas. Be-
cause of the remarkable parallels between personalist thought and
twentieth century American jurisprudence, a melding of insights from
each tradition may enrich the discourse and contribute to the resolu-
tion of some conflicts, puzzles, or dilemmas. In the mainstream of
American jurisprudential thought, perhaps that melding of insights
will offer a foundation for-or at least a beginning sketch of-a more
complete understanding of the person I will later describe as the au-
thentic judge and his task of deciding disputes and searching for and
offering justification for decisions.
The personalist emphasis on the judge as one who acts and de-
cides offers a foundation for melding personalist insights with the
mainstream of American jurisprudential thought, with its great
proliferation of ideas flowing from the rejection of flat, formalist law
and the recognition of multiple aspects of the person in our under-
standing of law. Perhaps personalist thought as applied to law, with
its fuller grasp of the person in action and in intellectual activity, may
contribute to the further development of American jurisprudential in-
sights and to the reconciliation of competing views. 7
76. See Donnelly, AM. J. Jums. Book Review, supra note 3, at 242; DAVID GRAN-
MELD, Tm INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW 14-36 (1988).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 101-27.
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IV. INSIGHT: AN INTROSPECTIVE MoMENT IN PERSONALISM AND
AMi-RIcAN JURISPRUDENCE
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., renown for many aphorisms and for
his intellectual creativity, often remarked that he just wanted the in-
sights, itself a fascinating comment on the creative process. 78 Bernard
Lonergan, reflecting on the moment of intellectual creation, found in-
spiration in a story about Archimedes, the Greek scientist. One day
Archimedes emerged from his bath in Syracuse, the ancient Greek
city-state in Sicily, shouting "Eureka" as he ran naked through the
streets in the excitement of a scientific discovery1 9 While in the bath,
Archimedes, according to legend, suddenly perceived that he could
determine whether the Tyrant of Syracuse's crown was gold without
destroying it by measuring whether the water it displaced was equal in
amount to that displaced by a package of gold. Lonergan commented
not only on the joy of discovery but also upon the suddenness-or
flash of-what he called insight.8 0 David Granfield summarizes
Lonergan's understanding of "insight" as follows:
What is an insight? It is a bright idea, a snap judgment, a
shrewd guess, a tentative understanding. Insights ground
every kind of knowledge. But an insight should not be con-
sidered to be like seeing something; it is not literally an intui-
tion. The naive realist thinks that he looks at his
experiences, the data of sense and consciousness, and then
judges. But he leaves out an essential step, the insight, which
occurs when the intelligence comprehends in the data some
kind of coherence, when the data begins to make sense, to
evidence a possibility, to suggest a meaning. An insight as
such is unverified and unproven; it may be wrong but it is
plausible. It is like love at first sight, perhaps an infatuation
but perhaps the beginning of a lifelong commitment.,,
As Lonergan understands it, insight is a sudden perception of a
pattern in the matter or data being examined.82 Typically one grasps
an insight after a period of hard study. Then perhaps while one is
shaving in the morning the lightening flash of insight occurs. Insight
78. LIVA BAKER, 1ins JUsTIcE FROM BEACON HILL: THE Ln-E AND T mEs OF OLIVER
WENDELL HoLmus 216-17, 273-74 (1991).
79. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 3-6.
80. IL
81. See GRANxIELD, supra note 76, at 54-55.
82. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 3-6; see also TRACY, supra note 10, at
105-12 (describing steps of inquiry that lead to insight).
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came to Archimedes in the bath. Jerome Frank, the distinguished but
radical legal realist who served as a judge of the Second Circuit, re-
ports a similar phenomenon in his book, Courts on Trial.83 Frank,
commenting on Judge Hutcheson's report that judges decide by
hunching, compares that with gestalt psychology:
Is Judge Hutcheson's description wholly mistaken? ... I be-
lieve not. Pertinent here is gestalt psychology, the main the-
sis of which is,. roughly, this: All thinking is done in forms,
pattern, configurations. A human response to a situation is
"whole." It is not made up of little bricks of sight, sound,
taste, and touch. It is an organized entity which is greater
than, and different from, the sum of what, on analysis, ap-
pear to be its parts. The gestaltist's favorite illustration is a
melody: A melody does not result from the summation of its
parti; thus to analyze a melody is to, destroy it. It is a basic,
primary, unit. The melody, a pattern, determines- the func-
tions of the notes, its parts; the notes, the parts, do not deter-
mine the melody. Just so, say the gestaltists, no analysis of a
pattern of thought, of a human response to a situation, can
account for the pattern ....
I do not suggest that anyone swallow whole this notion
of the "whole." But it does illuminate, does tell us some-
thing of importance about, men's reactions to experience. In
particular, it sheds light on a trial judge's "hunching." The
trial judge, we may say, experiences a gestalt.'
Karl Llewellyn also seized upon Judge Hutcheson's notion of
hunching and associated it with "situation sense," a favorite Llewellyn
term. 5 Llewellyn used situation sense in a variety of contexts. One
can find a good discussion in William Twining's biography, Karl Llew-
ellyn and The Realist Movement.86 Often Llewellyn would equate sit-
uation sense with horse sense which is definable as the uncommon
common sense of one experienced in horse trading.87 Llewellyn, as
the chief drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, was an admirer of
the situation sense of the experienced commercial judge. That situa-
tion sense represented an understanding of business patterns and
83. FRANK, supra note 64.
84. Id. at 170-71.
85. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 121 n.154
(1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW].
86. WILLIAM TwInING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 216-27
(1973).
87. Id. at 220 n.71.
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commercial relationships in commerce developed over years of expe-
rience representing clients in various industries and hearing commer-
cial disputes as a judge.8s Since Llewellyn also equated situation sense
with Judge Hutcheson's hunching, it resembled Frank's lightehing
gestalt89-the sudden perception of a pattern in the commercial situa-
tion before the judge but now based on long experience with commer-
cial cases.
In a uniquely balanced article, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudi-
cation: A Critical Phenomenology, Duncan Kennedy reports and
comments upon a similar phenomenon while offering an imaginary
phenomenology of a decision he would make if he were a judge in a
hypothetical case.90 Kennedy imagines he is a federal district court
judge faced with a request for an injunction in a labor dispute. The
workers, city bus drivers now on strike, are lying down in front of the
buses to prevent scabs from driving them. The company requests an
injunction. On initial impression, Kennedy presumes the law is on the
company's side and would allow the injunction. The critical phenome-
nology follows his review of the law through several stages including
"playing around with the rule" and "rack[ing his] brain."91 While in
despair from his inability to find a solution acceptable to his own
political position that the workers should control the means of pro-
duction, he suddenly has a "breakthrough." 9 He perceives the possi-
bility of recharacterizing the case not as a labor injunction situation
but rather as a First Amendment freedom of speech case in which
prior restraints such as injunctions are impermissible. That sudden
perception of a possibility for a recharacterization resembles Loner-
gan's insight, Frank's gestalt, and Llewellyn's hunching or situation
sense. It is a sudden perception of a pattern-in the data. Here it is the
perception of the possibility of reconfiguring the pattern, that is, a cre-
ative moment.
Kennedy, in his report of his imaginary decision-making process,
does not leap immediately from the breakthrough or creative insight
to judgment. Rather, he goes through a stage of checking out his in-
sight against the First Amendment cases for legitimacy but also for
88. See Donnelly, HoFsRA Book Review, supra note 1, at 906-11.
89. See FRANK, supra note 64, at 157-86; see also LLEWELLYN, THm COMMON LAW,
supra note 85, at 121 (explaining how judges draw on "uncommon knowledge" in making
decisions).
90. Kennedy, supra note 24.
91. Id. at 523.
92. Id. at 525.
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wisdom.93 Lonergan, discussing general intellectual method, also
notes that in most modem intellectual disciplines there is a checking-
out stage which follows the insight and, indeed, follows the formula-
tion of the theory.94 In traditional scientific method, verification of
the theory is a vital stage.95 Lonergan would not insist upon scientific
verification in other fields but would generalize from scientific and
other intellectual methods and insist upon a checking-out stage in gen-
eral intellectual method. He would call those who mistake the insight,
the sudden perception of a pattern, for reality-naive realists.96
Whether Llewellyn and Frank are naive realists in Lonergan's sense is
an interesting inquiry. It certainly is possible that, entranced by the
notion of the hunch or the gestalt, they would contemplate moving
directly to judgment from the insight.97 In judicial practice it may
be-and is worth considering-that the moment of insight is the mo-
ment of judgment. Perhaps it happens during oral argument or while
the judge is reading the briefs. On the other hand, both Llewellyn and
Frank often recommend restraining the gestalt or the hunch until fur-
ther consideration is possible.98 One function of the common law ad-
versary method is to suspend the gestalt until arguments on both sides
have been considered. Llewellyn, and Twining, when describing the
proper functioning of situation sense recommend a consideration of
the pattern of facts, relationships, and values in the commercial situa-
tion before an application of the legal categories. 99 That process will
restrain a gestalt based solely on the legal configurations before the
commercial situation and problem is adequately understood.
The recognition of the hunch or the gestalt, and its creative use in
framing a method for using the commercial judge's situation sense, is
a high point in the recovery of the person in American jurisprudence.
The introspective analysis of the judge's intellectual method necessary
to recognize the function of the hunch or the gestalt in the judicial
decision-making process carries the implication that the judge is a sub-
ject, a person whose thought process is worth examining. Classically,
if one recognizes oneself as a person then one is more likely to per-
93. Md at 525-33.
94. See LONERGAN, INSIGrr, supra note 8, at 284-86.
95. See TR~cy, supra note 10, at 88.
96. See GRANFr'mr, supra note 76, at 59.
97. See generally i at 58-61 (explaining realists' use of insight in judicial practice).
98. See TWINING, supra note 86, at 226-29; see Donnelly, Hon'rRA Book Review,
supra note 1, at 907-11.
99. See TWINING, supra note 86, at 226-29; see also Donnelly, HoFSTRA Book Review,
supra note 1, at 907-11 (drawing out overlooked aspects of situation sense).
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ceive others as persons. 1°° So, too, within the law. If one understands
law as an activity engaged in by persons such as the deciding judge
rather than as a system of rules, then it is more likely that those ap-
pearing before the court will be perceived as persons rather than as
cases to which the law needs to be applied.
In fact, Llewellyn and Frank were aware, not only of the judge as
person, but also of persons relating to each other in the situation
before the court. Llewellyn's situation sense requires the judge to ex-
amine and understand the pattern of human relations in the situa-
tion.10 1 Jerome Frank describes three-dimensional law, where we
perceive a decision maker who is a person, the rule or language ele-
ment, and the situation with its pattern of human relations.10 2 In con-
trast, Frank rejects the misunderstanding, which he calls flat law,
where one focuses on the rule or language element.10 3
The turn to the subject in Frank, Llewellyn, and Lonergan not
only leads to explicit reflection on intellectual method or the judge's
decision-making process but also uncovers the judge as a person in
relationship to other persons. That revelation is surprising because of
the emphasis on action in personalist thought and American legal re-
alism, an emphasis that could be contrasted with the pale, sickly cast
of thought that one might associate with introspective analysis of the
subject. However, when we discuss the judge's decision-making pro-
cess and his intellectual method, we are discussing action.' °4
The judge's action relates to others through the moment of judg-
ment, which is preceded by the moment of insight or gestalt, and the
checking-out process. Our effort to understand that decision-making
process is for the sake of action and for the sake of improving the
relationship between persons in the legal system. Nevertheless, our
100. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 19-30.
101. See TwINiNG, supra note 86, at 226-27.
102. See FRANK, supra note 64, at 316-25.
103. I&
104. It is important to note the distinction in the characterization of a judge as a person
in action and as one engaged in intellectual activity. As a judge broadens his scope of
intellectual activity, his conception of the field of study also broadens. Increasing one's
intellectual activity, then, provides a judge with additional avenues for action. For a useful
analogy see MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 53-54. Macmurray
points out that a child's developmental process consists of distinct but related stages. Id.
A child "must first learn... of sensory discrimination or of movement." Md at 54. Once
this process is learned it becomes a component of wider skills that the child acquires. I&
Macmurray points out that, "[i]n this way a hierarchical system of skills is developed, the
lower levels of which support the higher skills . .." Id. Similarly, the judge's intellectual
activity, while a distinct skill, supports a wider skill: how the judge acts.
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reflection on that process, as Marcel would point out, is secondary; the
action is primary."0 5 It is through the action that the judge finds him-
self in relation to other persons. By reflection on that action, on the
moment of decision making, the judge perceives himself as a person
and those appearing before him as persons engaged with him in a
common action. The insights of Lonergan and Macmurray merge in
our understanding of the judge's decision-making process.
From this high but introspective moment in the recovery of the
person in American jurisprudence, our reflection on the judge's deci-
sion-making process should move to a discussion of method. That dis-
cussion should be a more general reflection on the judge's intellectual
and decision-making method and the insights that Lonergan's thought
provides for elaborating and clarifying American jurisprudential anal-
ysis of that method.
V. METHOD AND PERS6iALIST CRITIQUE OF METHOD
A major aspect of Lonergan's work is his reflection on intellec-
tual method.'06 In Insight, he analyzes a series of particular meth-
ods-scientific, mathematical, and the commonsense methods, which
would include the historical, the theological, and, we could add, the
legal. Lonergan's reflection on intellectual method begins with in-
sight, a phenomenon he finds in all intellectual method.0 7 David
Tracy describes the movement in Lonergan's analysis from insight to
method as follows:
Thirdly, insights do not remain merely in isolation.
They coalesce into sets of insights and sets of definitions, axi-
oms, postulates. The very dynamism of inquiry, moreover,
provokes ever further questions, some of which cannot be
handled on the basis of the existing set of insights and theo-
rems. In short, as one moves ever further into the inquiry, an
exigence for an ever higher viewpoint begins to emerge.
08
A theory, in Lonergan's thought, consists of a series of related
insights.10 9 Scientific method requires that a theory be verifiable and
scientific inquiry pursues continual efforts at verification. In Insight,
Lonergan is concerned with general intellectual method developed
105. See MA.RcEL, supra note 50.
106. See LoNERGAN, INsiwGr, supra note 8, at 33-103; LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOL.
oGY, supra note 8, at 3-25; TRicy, supra note 10, at 104-32.
107. See LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 3-32.
108. TRicy, supra note 10, at 106.
109. Id at 67-68, 235.
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from reflection on a series of particular methods, including the scien-
tific."' As noted above, Lonergan, in all intellectual methods, would
require a checking-out stage. A "method may be defined as a norma-
tive pattern of related and recurrent operations yielding cumulative
and progressive results.""'
Method itself, however, requires verification or a checking out.
One cannot verify the scientific method by the scientific method. That
would be to argue in a circle. In modern times the scientific method is
admired and pursued because of its large record of success. That, of
course, is one test of method-whether it works, whether it produces
satisfactory progress in the pursuit of inquiry. One also must reflect
on the purpose for which one uses a method. The scientific method,
for example, would have only tangential relevance in the pursuit of.
business activities. A method must be adapted to and be successful to
some degree for the purpose one has in an inquiry or an activity. A
major contribution of Lonergan's work is to focus our attention on the
check-out of or justification for particular methods and of general in-
tellectual method."12
Scientific method is the most successful of the modern methods
and may serve as an important foundation for reflecting on general
intellectual method. Nevertheless, there are other methods which
serve purposes for which the scientific method is not suited. Of partic-
ular importance for law are what Lonergan calls the commonsense
methods. 1 3 Common sense may be defined as the self-correcting pro-
cess of learning from living.114 It, of course, is important in con-
ducting everyday life and establishing relations with others. One
learns how to go to the store and to find other locations by the self-
correcting process of learning through living. Aspects of general intel-
lectual method may be found in common sense as well as the scientific
method. For example, there is a checking-out stage which is very use-
ful-failure to find the store often will result in beneficial adjustments
in method. Commonsense method itself, then, is subject to continual
adjustment and change in view of its success or failure in the pursuit of
various human purposes-some very practical, such as finding the
store.
110. See LONERoAN, INsIrHT, supra note 8, at xvii-xxx; LONERGAN, METHOD IN TH--
OLOGY, supra note 8, at 4-6.
111. TRACY, supra note 10, at 235.
112. See LONERGAN, MEMOD IN THEOLoGY, supra note 8, at 20-25.
113. See LONERGAN, INSimHT, supra note 8, at 173-244; TRACY, supra note 10, at 113-
23.
114. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supr note 8, at 298.
January 1995]
566 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Lonergan describes a series of more specialized comnmonsense
methods, including historical and theological methods.11 5 When
thinking of specialized commonsense methods one is reminded of
Llewellyn's analogy between horse sense and situation sense. Horse
sense is the uncommon common sense of one experienced in horse
trading.116 The parallel to Lonergan's definition of common sense is
remarkable. A horse trader has learned his business from the self-
correcting process of living and working in his profession. Similarly,
an experienced commercial judge acquires situation sense. 17 The ac-
tivity of lawyers in general and their work with law could be described
as a commonsense discipline or method.
Method and the reflection on method have been important as-
pects of American legal thought in the twentieth century. We have
already noted Karl Llewellyn's analysis and praise of the grand style
of the common law which he found in both the -formative era of
American law and during the mid-twentieth century. 118 He contrasted
the grand style, with its openness to reason, purpose, and situation
sense, and its emphasis upon leeways in the precedent and case-by-
case development of the law, to the strict style which prevailed at the
turn of the twentieth century, with its tendency to treat law as a closed
logical system." 9 Jerome Frank, in Courts on Trial, offers multiple
insights into judicial method with an emphasis on three-dimensional
law in which the judge perceives himself as a person, recognizes what
could be described as an open-textured rule or language element, and
attempts to perceive the human relations in the situation or case
before him.'20 He would contrast three-dimensional law with flat law,
which emphasizes the rule or language element. 2' Similarly, Roscoe
Pound contrasted mechanical jurisprudence with sociological jurispru-
dence or social engineering, which would be concerned with the care-
ful analysis of social advantage and the development of law to adjust
115. Compare LoNEROAN, INsimrr, supra note 8, at 173-244 (discussing specialized
concepts of common sense) with LoNERGAN, MEmoD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 214-
20,233-34 (discussing common sense in terms of thought, speech, and history) and TRACy,
supra note 10, at 189-91, 232-39 (discussing Lonergan's classifications of commonsense
methods).
116. See TWnIuNG, supra note 86, at 503; see also Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Ho-
rizons, supra note 13, at 230 n.105 (recounting Llewellyn's definition of horse sense).
117. See Donnelly, HoFsTRA Book Review, supra note 1, at 908-11.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89, 97-103.
119. See LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 217-23.
120. See FRANK, supra note 64, at 316-25; see also supra text accompanying notes 64-65
(contrasting judge as individual with judge as intellectual).
121. See FRANK, supra note 64, at 316-25.
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and recognize human interests.122 These early and mid-twentieth cen-
tury developments of method-would be in deliberate conflict with for-
malism and the analytical methods of Christopher Columbus Langdell
and his tendency to treat law asa closed logical system.
Leaping forward to the late twentieth century, we have noted the
imaginary but critical phenomenology of a judicial decision produced
by Duncan Kennedy with its reflections on judicial decision-making
method.12 Very recently, Robin West has contrasted the use of narra-
tive with the emphasis on rights discourse in the Supreme Court's cap-
ital punishment decisions. 24 The adaptation of deconstruction to law
is an important recent contribution to, and discussion of, legal, and
perhaps, judicial method. However, the major analyst of judicial deci-
sion-making method in the late twentieth century is Ronald Dworkin.
In Law's Empire and Taking Rights Seriously, he offers a judicial deci-
sion-making method grounded in political friendship or in respect and
concern for each individual. He emphasizes both interpretation of the
law to make the most that can be made of it and rigorous consistency
with a principled understanding of the precedent."z Whether these
various aspects of his thought and method are compatible with each
other is an open question.
During the twentieth century then, along with the piecemeal re-
covery of the role for the person in law, there has been a proliferation
of different creative approaches to legal method and to judicial deci-
sion-making method. The opportunity offered by Lonergan for criti-
cal reflection on intellectual method, then, would seem to be a
potentially useful contribution to twentieth century legal theory and
method. 26
Developing Lonergan's thought, one could critique various con-
tributions to judicial decision-making method based on their worka-
bility and whether they more or less satisfactorily fulfill the purposes
and function of law and the settlement of disputes by judges. Such a
critique, of course, would require discussion, debate, and exchange of
views concerning the purpose and function of law. However, one is
concerned with judicial decision-making method for the sake of ac-
tion. A judge is concerned with his own conduct, with what he ought
122. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 247-53.
123, See Kennedy, supra note 24.
124. See Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seri-
ously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990).
125. See DwomxrN, LAw's EMerE, supra note 25, at 87-113, 176-224; DwoRunw, TAK-
ING RirHms SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 180.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 78-116.
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to do, and with what orders he ought to issue. A critic of judicial
method wants to-improve the actions of judges generally, which would
include improvement of the dispute settlement function and its by-
product-the creation of law. In this context it makes sense to merge
the thought of Lonergan and Macmurray-Lonergan's critique of
method and Macmurray's emphasis on persons in relation through ac-
tion. That merger makes sense here-because the critique of judicial
method is for the sake of improving action and the relations between
persons and society. To the extent that a particular understanding of
judicial method overlooks the judge as a person or fails to insist upon
persons and their relations in the situation before the court, that un-
derstanding of method is less satisfactory. To the extent that the role
of persons is emphasized, the proposed view of judicial method is
more satisfactory. Arguably, a critique of method whose cutting edge
is an inquiry into the role for persons provides a powerful personalist
tool for evaluating, and perhaps unifying, the vast array of proposed
methods and contributions to judicial decision-making method in
twentieth century American thought.
H.L.A. Hart described formalism as the vice in juristic thought
that seeks to disguise or deny the presence of choice.12 7 One could
imagine the proliferation of different juristic methods, particularly
those which have recovered one or more aspects of the person, as a
series of attacks upon or attempts to escape the clutch of Langdell's
logical method and the flat law of formalism. Formalism, however,
could be defined more broadly than contemplated by Hart. It could,
for example, include all forms of legal reasoning and judicial method
because using an accepted method is to confine and deny choice.
Short of that whirlpool, however, the- ongoing debate over formalism
and method could be perceived as a battle over or against narrow
forms of legal reasoning. In the opening skirmishes, Holmes rejected
Langdellian analysis with his contention that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience."'1 Currently, in contrast to
Holmes, Dworkin offers an understanding of judicial method'in which
logic plays a predominant role. The realists discussed, analyzed, used,
and criticized what could be described as the traditional and ordinary
methods of common law reasoning. For example, in The Common
Law Tradition, Llewellyn attempts to develop and make more sophis-
127. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 51, at 626.
128. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 2, at 5.
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ticated what he describes as the grand style of the common law.129
The effort was to develop-new forms of reasoning related to the tradi-
tional use of precedent, such as situation sense, and to adapt the tradi-
tional reasoning by analogy and distinction to the needs of policy
analysis or to the endeavor to relate law to persons. The crits, mem-
bers of the critical legal studies movement, use traditional forms of
legal reasoning as well as deconstruction to reach multiple results.'30
Judge Posner recently qualified his emphasis on law and economics
and his goal of wealth maximization by promoting a broader pragma-
tism in which the ordinary methods of legal reasoning play a larger
role.131 Nevertheless, he insists that law is not self-contained and that
the traditional methods of legal reasoning provide inspiration rather
than justification for a judge's decision. 32 In Law's Empire, Dworkin
argues that pragmatism, as he defines it, is morally bankrupt both be-
cause it lacks an overarching moral theory and because it rejects rigor-
ous consistency. 33 Under a critical view of Dworkin, he could be said
to reject pragmatism in law because it avoids narrowly logical reason-
ing and insists upon using multiple forms of traditional common law
reasoning. The battle, then, could be portrayed as a fight over the
forms of legal reasoning, narrow and limited, or broad, creative, and
relating to multiple human concerns.
Alternatively, with the insights of another vision, or using another
set of eyeglasses, one could perceive many of these participants in the
discussion of judicial decision-making method as capturing or empha-
sizing one or another of the aspects of the person in law. Like the
blind men examining the elephant, they perceive the tail which seems
to be a rope, the legs which resemble tree trunks, and so one or an-
other of the aspects of the person in law is emphasized in various un-
derstandings of judicial method. For example, Dworkin has
129. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw, supra note 85, at 36. See generally TwiNirG,
supra note 86 (documenting legal theories and legal realism).
130. The crits, for reasons of tactics, strategy, or criticism, often use traditional forms of
legal reasoning. Traditional methodology gives the crits legitimacy as they attack estab-
lished ideology. For example, see Duncan Kennedy's use of First Amendment freedom of
speech rights in his article, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenome-
nology, supra note 24. The crits, however, have also used deconstruction as a form of legal
reasoning. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RiGHTs, supra note 20, at 70,
72.
131. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIsPRUDENC E (1990) (ar-
guing basic assumption of economics-that people are wealth maximizers-is seriously
incomplete) Ihereinafter POSNER, T-E PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE].
132. 1& at 71-124.
133. See DwoRyiN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 95-96, 151-64.
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recognized the importance in judicial reasoning of a commitment to
afford each person equal respect and concern; hence, he has framed a
decision-making process in which the judge's moral theory, grounded
in political friendship, has an important role.134  To the extent that
Dworkin expresses a theoretical concern for each person, he has rec-
ognized the importance of persons in the' cases before Hercules, his
ideal judge. To the extent that he provides an important role for the
judge's moral theory, he recognizes the judge as a person. Like the
blind men, however, he fails to grasp the fullness of the phenomenon
he is examining. He overlooks the relations between persons in the
situations before Hercules,13 the impact of his decisions on a variety
of conflicting interests of real persons,136 and lacks the flexibility nec-
essary to regularly readjust the law in view of its adverse impact on
people and their needs. This blindness leaves Dworkin open to the
charge that he has created a huge juggernaut capable of crushing peo-
ple while Hercules, in the tower on top of the machine, proclaims: "I
afford all persons equal respect and concern." In contrast, indeed al-
most like a jigsaw puzzle piece which interlocks with Dworkin's views,
the American pragmatists emphasize precisely those aspects of the
person in the law which Dworkin overlooks while themselves passing
over the importance of moral theory in law, particularly a moral the-
ory which emphasizes political friendship and the importance of each
person.
The postmoderns, including the crits, recover multiple aspects of
the person in law' 37 -including the person's political, social, and cul-
tural horizons. 3 The crits and other postmoderns are particularly
concerned with detecting oppression and moving to correct it, perhaps
by radical measures. 139 Nevertheless, their narrow equation of law
134. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 180-83, 272-78; see
also DwORKIN, LAw's EMpI'R, supra note 25, at 176-90 (examining assumption that integ-
rity is distinct ideal of politics).
135. Compare Llewellyn's situation sense. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89,
97-101. See also Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 231-37
(contrasting Llewellyn's "grand style" with Dworkin's approach to precedent).
136. Compare sociological jurisprudence. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24;
see also Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 247-53 (comparing
and contrasting impact and interest jurisprudence). See generally Donnelly, HOI'STrA
Book Review, supra note 1 (discussing how Pound contrasted mechanical and sociological
jurisprudence).
137. See DONNELLY, TIE LANGUAGE AND USFS OF RIGHTs, supra note 20, at 5-6, 41-
43.
138. See discussion infra part V1.
139. A common theme with the crits and other postmoderns is the goal of reshaping
society so that the use of rights to protect current establishment interests is no longer possi-
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with politics and their equally narrow pursuit of the political ends
which seem important to them, produces a rigorous inflexibility akin
to that of Dworkin. While Dworkin achieves rigorous consistency
through abstract principle, the crits and other postmoderns, despite
deconstruction and the creative reconstruction of law, produce an in-
flexible consistency of result by evaluating and reaching their conclu-
sions in the context of a rigorous political ideology. Like Dworkin,
they overlook the impact of their ideologically oriented conclusions
on real human relations and fail to use the tools developed by the
American pragmatists to adapt law to multiple human situations and
concerns.
To the extent that a proposed legal or judicial decision-making
method overlooks aspects. of the judge as a person or fails to appreci-
ate the impact of law on persons and their relationships, both gener-
ally and in the particular cases before the judge, that method is less
satisfactory. To the extent that proposed methods recover a role for,
and an understanding of, the judge as a person, that method is more
satisfactory. Likewise, a method is more satisfactory to the extent that
it calls attention to the beneficial or adverse impact of law on persons
and their relationships and offers new ways of perceiving and under-
standing how law affects human beings in general and in the cases
before the court. There should be an ongoing effort not only to cri-
tique proposed methods in these terms but also to collect and corre-
late new understandings and methods for understanding the relation
between law and persons. By this means we will gradually be able to
discern the outline of the elephant as we explore various portions of
its body.
Lonergan, then, has made the critique of method possible.". By
merging his insights with those of Macmurray, 141 one can critique pro-
posed legal and judicial decision-making methods based on whether
they have overlooked aspects of the person in law or have offered new
understandings of the person in law. This proposed critique would be
ble. The crits are concerned with how a regime of rights oppresses and restrains society.
See DONNELLY, TiE LAN GUAGE AND Uses OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 5-6; see also
Mark lushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tx. L. REV. 1363 (1984) [hereinafter Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights] (developing four related critiques of rights); Mark V. "ibshnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 781, 781 (1983) [hereinafter T'shnet, Following the Rules Laid Down] (comparing
"two leading theories of modem constitutional law that attempt to ensure the rule of law
by limiting the discretion of judges"); Unger, supra note 71 (discussing critical legal studies
movement).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 106-40.
141. See supra part II.
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concerned with whether a method works and serves the purposes and
functions of law and judicial decision making and also with whether a
method is grounded in an understanding of the decision maker as a
person and those in the situation as persons. Lonergan's turn to the
subject allows the introspective discovery and examination of
method.142 That introspective reflection allows the judge to recognize
himself as a person. Joined with Macmurray's insights, that introspec-
tive reflection on method is for the sake of action, which relates the
judge to the persons in the situations before him. 43 One could sum-
marize this merger of the thought of Lonergan and Macmurray by
noting that we can move through an understanding of method to ac-
tion which relates us to persons.
VI. HORIZONS
Imagine a primitive society where a young man from a mountain
hunting village journeys to the oceanside and settles in a fishing vil-
lage.14 At first everything seems strange to him. But gradually, by
what Lonergan would call a commonsense learning process, he be-
comes acquainted with the ways of the fishing village.
We all have shared a similar experience. Although only some of
us have traveled and changed location, all of us have attended law
school and retain a vivid recollection of the strangeness of the new
intellectual environment and of our gradual mastery of its ways.
Some of us have multiple experiences similar to this. We have studied
economics or philosophy. Perhaps we have mastered the folk ways,
business environment, and the law relevant to an industry and remem-
ber its strangeness and our surprise and interest in the new patterns of
human interaction found there.
Bernard Lonergan would describe these experiences as the cross-
ing of horizons.145 The term, horizon, is used by philosophers such as
Lonergan, Heidegger, 'and Gadamer to elucidate the normal human
condition of having limited knowledge and understanding. 6 When
142. See supra notes 106-17, 126-27 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 52-58, 126-27 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 257 (dis-
cussing horizon crossing and transcending).
145. Id. at 254-63; see also LONERGAN, METHOD iN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 235-37
(describing how horizons may differ); TRAcy, supra note 10, at 1-21, 104-32 (discussing
Lonergan's horizon analysis and its development in INsrr).
146. See MARTIN M. HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND D"FERENC 34-35 (Joan Stambaugh
trans., 1969); TRAcY, supra note 10. This Article uses the term "horizon" to show that
judges have a responsibility to see and understand beyond the familiar and to take differ-
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describing intellectual horizons one employs the rather useful physical
analogue which Bernard Lonergan refers to as follows:,
In a literal sense the word, horizon, denotes the bounding
circle, the line at which the earth and sky appear to meet.
This line is the limit of one's field of vision. As one moves
about, it recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for
different standpoints, there are different horizons. More-
over, for each different standpoint and horizon, there are dif-
ferent divisions of the totality of visible objects. Beyond the
horizon lie the objects that, at least for the moment, cannot
be seen. Within the horizon lie the objects that can now be
seen.
147
The young man from the mountain village changed physical as
well as intellectual horizons when: he journeyed to the oceanside and,
as a result, could see new things which were not visible in the moun-
tains. One virtue of the physical analogue is that it offers the possibil-
ity of changing or crossing horizons.148 One can journey from the
mountains to the seaside. Intellectually, one can choose to study eco-
nomics or to go to law school. As a result, one's intellectual vision will
change; one will see and appreciate aspects of life which one was not
aware of or did not understand before the change of horizons.
Most importantly, perhaps, the questions one asks change.149
"Horizons in general may be established by the questions one asks or
the purposes for which the questions are asked.' 15 A classic example
ent viewpoints. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 254
n.250.
147. LoNERGAN, Mm-HOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 235-36. For an introduction
to Lonergan's analysis, see TRAcY, supra note 10, at 1-21.
148. See Bernard Lonergan, Metaphysics as Horizon, in COLLEcCTION 202-2Q (F.E.
Crowe ed., 1967); see also Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at
254-63-(discussing horizons in context of legal decision making).
149. Horizons depend on a three-fold division in the knowledge process. The first divi-
sion is the range of questions that a person can raise and answer. The second division is
the set of questions that are significant to a person, but which she is yet unable to answer.
This is the area known as docta ignorantia. The third division consists of the questions that
are incomprehensible to one. These are the questions that one cannot even ask because
they have no significance for the person. raditionally stated, this is the area of indocta
ignorantia. Horizons can be said to be the boundary between one's docta and indocta. A
second view states that what lies beyond one's horizons is the set of questions that are
meaningless to one but nonetheless significant. TRACy, supra note 10, at 9-10; DoNNELLY,
THE LANGUAGE AND Usus OF RIGrs, supra note 20, at n.293 (quoting racy's description
of three-fold division).
150. Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 255; cf. LONERGAN,
METHOD IN THMOLOGY, supra note 8, at 235-37 (describing additional ways in which hori-
zons can develop).
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describes a botanist and an animal biologist walking through a country
field.' 5 ' The botanist is aware of the vegetation and recognizes differ-
ent species in some detail while the animal biologist has a similar ap-
preciation of the persistent insect life, which may be simply annoying
to the botanist. Lonergan describes intellectual horizons that result
from past education and which govern the course of our intellectual
inquiry as follows:
Horizons, finally, are the structured resultant of past
achievement and, as well, both the condition and the limita-
tion of further development. They are structured. All learn-
ing is, not a mere addition to previous learning, but rather an
organic growth out of it. So all our intentions, statements,
deeds stand within contexts. To such contexts we appeal
when we outline the reasons for our goals, when we clarify,
amplify, qualify our statements, or when we explain our
deeds. Within such contexts must be fitted each new item of
knowledge and each new factor in our attitudes. What does
not fit, will not be noticed or, if forced on our attention, it
will seem irrelevant or unimportant. Horizons then are the
sweep of our intersts [sic] and of our knowledge; they are the
fertile source of further knowledge and care; but they also
are the boundaries that limit our capacities for assimilating
more than we already have attained. 5 2
Horizons, both physical and intellectual, not only allow or create
vision, they also confine. The young man in the mountain village can-
not see the ocean. By the seaside he cannot see the mountains
although he knows he will find them if he undertakes the return jour-
ney. When we became immersed in legal study, we gradually lost in-
terest in matters that fascinated us while in college. Horizons, then,
both create and confine vision.
153
Reflecting on legal method, a judge who is concerned with per-
sons must, as Socrates and Frank comment, know himself.154 He must
be aware of his limited knowledge and understanding, of his horizons.
An additional criterion for. critiquing judicial decision-making method
would be the inquiry into whether the method provides for regularly
151. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsEs OF RioHis, supra note 20, at 49.
152. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 254 n.250.
153. Id. at 236; see also TaAcy, supra note 10, at 9-10 (placing horizons in framework of
three-fold division of knowledge).
154. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 256-57.
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recognizing and crossing horizons. 5 In a previous article, I
commented:
A judge who wants to take rights seriously will provide
means in his decision making methodology for both tran-
scending and crossing horizons. Horizons are established by
various processes for learning, by the devices and techniques
which accompany these processes, and by the information
and ways of acting which are the results of their use. Hori-
zons can be transcended or crossed by using similar learning
processes to establish new, different, or more encompassing
horizons and may be accompanied by techniques for re-
straining the vision-blocking characteristics of one's present
horizons. 56
In that article I both praised and criticized the decision-making
method that Dworkin prescribed for his model, Judge Hercules, in
Taking Rights Seriously. 7 Dworkin has changed slightly and devel-
oped further the methodology for Judge Hercules in Law's Empire.
Dworkin now prescribes a virtue of integrity not only for the individ-
ual judge but for law.158 Integrity requires a consistency with a princi-
pled understanding of past precedent that allows little leeway and is
rigorous. When Hercules comes to the bench he should perform the
herculean task of reexamining existing precedent and, indeed, the en-
tirety of law with a view toward offering a new interpretation which
will make the best that can be made of the law.' 5 9 Some past prece-
dent may be discarded as mistakes under Hercules's new interpreta-
tion, but the judge must then decide all new cases in a manner that is
rigorously consistent with his interpretation of law. 6' Hercules could,
at some future point, undergo a conversion and as a result he would
offer a yet newer interpretation, discarding some old precedent, in-
cluding his own, as mistakes.16' However, there is little room for in-
155. Id. at 258.
156. Id. at 259-60.
157. Id. at 259.
158. See DWORK, LAw's EMPiR, supra note 25, at 176-275.
159. When a judge declares that a particular principle is instinct in law, he reports
not a simple-minded claim about motives of past statesmen ... but an interpretive
proposal: that the principle both fits and justifies some complex part of legal
practice, that it provides an attractive way to see, in the structure of that practice,
the consistency of principle integrity requires.
Id. at 228.
160. See DwoRsiN, TAK, G RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 118-23. Dworkin's
theory of mistakes allows a judge to discount some past decisions if they are no longer in
accord with his theory. However, this flexibility is usable in only a few situations.
161. Id.
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cremental change in Hercules's thought. Incremental change would
violate the virtue of integrity. Integrity, then, prevents Hercules from
reaching out on a day-to-day, case-by-case basis for new understand-
ings of the persons who appear before him.162 The judicial method
which Dworkin has prescribed for Judge Hercules creates large vision-
blocking barriers to the regular crossing of horizons. 16 Those barriers
lead a critic of Dworkin to ask whether Hercules is capable of taking
concrete, real persons and their rights seriously.
In contrast, the American pragmatists whom Dworkin criticizes
as morally bankrupt' 14 have created multiple devices for crossing hori-
zons and reaching out to persons in situations.165 Several of these al-
ready have been noted in this Article, including Pound's impact and
interest analysis, 66 which offers a lawmaker a regular opportunity for
assessing the effect of law on real persons with real interests, and
Llewellyn's situation sense,167 which requires the judge to restrain a
gestalt based solely on the law and past precedent until he appreciates
the pattern of relations and values in the situation before him.
The realists, particularly Llewellyn and Frank, first called our at-
tention in law to the phenomenon which Lonergan calls horizons.
They emphasized the impact of a judge's political, social, and cultural
background on his decisions and ihen began to create devices for
overcoming the obstacles to vision created by existing horizons.
168
Lonergan describes those vision-blocking characteristics as follows:
As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge,
and the range of our interests are bounded. As fields of vi-
sion vary with one's standpoint, qo too the scope of one's
knowledge and the range of one's interests vary with the pe-
riod in which one lives, one's social background and milieu,
one's education and personal development. So there has
arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the
word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon
is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests:
one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's hori-
162. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 250-51.
163. Id. at 263-75.
164. See Dwoun', LAw's EmpIRE, supra note 25, at 151-75.
165. See supra part V.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 118-22.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
168. The realists were aware of the judge as a person. Their introspective analysis of the
judge's decision-making process involved taking account of his political, cultural, and social
background. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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zon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest
and of knowledge. 6 9
Lonergan offers a number of means for overcoming the vision-
blocking characteristic of horizons. 170 Some means may be classified
as crossing horizons,17 1 reaching out to new horizons. One crosses ho-
rizons in the same way one creates horizons. Like the young man
from the mountain village who journeyed to the fishing village, one
simply can go there. A judge'may study economics. He then will ask
new questions and understand new problems. He may undertake the
study of a new industry or the problems of a minority group in society.
A Brandeis brief from counsel may assist the judge in that process.
The judge may develop a decision-making methodology which has a
place for horizon crossing-for the Brandeis brief, for impact and in-
terest analysis, for situation sense. All these would fit within what
Lonergan calls methods for crossing horizons. 72 Other means could
be classified as ways of transcending horizons. 3 A higher theory, in-
cluding a higher moral theory, may provide one with a broader view
which would include both acceptance of one's own previous theoreti-
cal or moral views and those of others.' 74 When a judge with a partic-
ular political, moral, or cultural background puts on the judicial robe
and mounts the bench, he may perceive a duty of fairness to those
with other backgrounds which he would not have accepted as readily
before his appointment to the judiciary. The new judge with a com-
mitment to fairness has transcended his previous. horizons. It also
would be helpful if he would cross horizons by enlarging his under-
standing of the great variety of human situations.
Dworkin's Judge Hercules may be said to transcend, rather than
cross, horizons.' 75 Hercules's rigorous consistency with his principled
169. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 236.
170. See LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 173-244; Donnelly, Principles, Persons,
and Horizons, supra note 13, at 256-63; see also TRACY, supra note 10, at 1-21 (introducing
Lonergan's horizon analysis).
171. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 256; see also
DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 48-55 (discussing
concept of horizons and its influence on our understanding and interest).
172. See LONERGAN, INsIGHT, supra note 8, at 319-39; LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOL-
OGY, supra note 8, at 81-99; TRACY, supra note 10, at 15-21, 133-39; Donnelly, Principles,
Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 259-63.
173. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 259 n.268; see
also DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 51-55 (discussing
difference between transcending and crossing horizons).
174. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 260-63.
175. Id. at 259.
January 1995]
578 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
interpretation of law allows him to transcend previous political, social,
and cultural horizons. 176 His new interpretation of law, however, cre-
ates a new horizon with its own vision-blocking aspects. 177 The lack of
horizon-crossing devices in Dworkin's method prevents Hercules from
overcoming the barriers to vision created by rigorous adherence to his
interpretation of law.
178
The crits, drawing upon postmodern European thought and
building upon the insights of the legal realists, have made the phe-
nomenon which Lonergan labels horizons a central aspect of their
thought. 179 We are all controlled, according to the crits, by the dead
hand or the horizons of the past, particularly by the liberal capitalism
inherited from the Enlightenment. 180 The accepted horizons in soci-
ety, influenced heavily by the social and economic advantages of the
established classes, control our vision and prevent us from perceiving
and addressing oppression. 8' Deconstruction, as used by the crits, is
a useful device for breaking down old horizons and overcoming their
barriers to vision. Thus, it should be added to the list of horizon-
crossing techniques.
Nevertheless, the crits resemble Dworkin in some respects. 182 In
place of a rigorous adherence to a principled interpretation of law,
many crits would insist upon rigorous consistency with'political ideol-
ogy.' 83 However, one must recognize that the crits would, at times, be
willing to deconstruct their own positions. Roberto Unger, in his ide-
alized vision of society, would provide a place for destabilization
rights so that the ideologically reconstructed new world could itself be
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. The crits recognize that ideological commitments create horizons. They use that
understanding as a basis to attack current legal traditions rather than to create horizon-
crossing methods in their own decision-making process. However, it must be noted that
some crits may have begun to enter a creative mode. For example, Duncan Kennedy's
article, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, offers limited
horizon-crossing techniques. Kennedy allows for dialogue between judges, which allows
for horizon crossing. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 522-27. The effectiveness of this
technique is limited, however, because the conversations remain at a doctrinal level. See
DoNNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 38-43, 51-55.
180. See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1036-39; see generally Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,
supra note 139 (arguing that since competing rights can always be posited, jurisprudential
balancing of those rights serves status quo).
181. See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1036-39.
182. See DoNNELLY, TIm LANGUAGE AND UsEs OF Rirnrrs, supra note 20, at 41-43,54-
55, 70-71, 85-88.
183. Id.
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overturned by those oppressed by the new vision. 184 The crits are ever
aware of the prospects of oppression by establishment ideologies,
even those newly established. Yet, one detects an absence of concern
for the concrete, real person and a tendency to overlook that person
and the pattern of relations in his situation in favor of an ideologically
supportable result. See, for example, the decision-making process of
the imaginary judge in Duncan Kennedy's article, Freedom and Con-
straint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology."8 Kennedy keeps
searching for a politically correct solution rather than critically exam-
ining the pattern of human relations in the situation. He assumes
from his ideology the best way to promote the cause of humanity in
the situation. There is an absence in critical legal studies thought of
the multiple devices found in early pragmatist and legal realist meth-
ods for reaching out to and understanding persons in the situation.1'
A personalist critique of legal method or judicial decision-making
method, then, would note the presence or absence of horizon-crossing
devices. A judge, aware of his limited knowledge and understanding,
of his horizons, is a judge who knows himself as a person. If, in addi-
tion, he critically reexamines his decision-making methodology with a
view to providing means for regularly crossing horizons, he is a judge
who is concerned for persons in a variety of human situations different
from his own. Such a judge is a person who acts in relation to others
with a critical awareness of method, horizons, and the manner in
which they affect his actions, and hence, his relations with others.
VII. PRINCIPLES, IDEOLOGY, AND COMMITMIENT TO PERSONS
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is renowned for his statement in
Lochner v. New York that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide con-
crete cases."'8 ? This aphorism is not unrelated to his earlier comment,
in The Common Law, that "[tjhe life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience."'' 8 Holmes may have had in mind principles as
used in traditional legal method, which could be defined as a policy
theme running through a series of cases. When one perceives law as a
closed logical system, such principles could be abstracted from the
184. See Unger, supra note 71, at 599-600.
185. See generally Kennedy, supra note 24 (examining thought process of judicial deci-
sion making and explaining how legal doctrine constrains judges).
186. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsES OF RiGRrs, supra note 20, at 38-40,51-
55.
187. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
188. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, supra note 2, at 5.
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cases over the Bunsen burner of the Socratic method, as Langdell
would say, and then used as the foundation or general premise for
deductive reasoning in future decisions,18 9 Using principles in this
manner would insulate the judge from the experience offered by each
new case. It would also overlook persons and their relationships in
the concrete cases before the court.
Participating in the quarrels over traditional legal method, Llew-
ellyn would recommend that principles be employed as guidelines, if
at all, and then be developed in accordance with the grand style of the
common law on a case-by-case basis.190 Llewellyn would not advocate
deciding cases by deducing the holding from a general principle.191
Rather, the principle should be applied only after a careful use of
analogy and distinction under the guidance of the judge's situation
sense.192 The use of traditional principles in Llewellyn's method
would not lead the judge to overlook persons and their relationships
in the concrete cases before the court.
Dworkin, in "Hard Cases," chapter 4 of Taking Rights Seriously,
describes principles in an entirely different manner than that used by
Holmes, Langdell, and Llewellyn.' 93 Principles are political reasons
for holdings in concrete cases based on assertions of individual
rights. 94 In contrast, Dworkin defines policies as political reasons for
decisions based on group advantage.' 95 According to Dworkin, courts
should decide on the basis of principles rather than policies.'95 Strong
principles should prevail over competing strong policies in the court's
reasoning process. Dworkin offers a hierarchy of reasons for deci-
sions upholding concrete rights.'9 For example, a right not to be seg-
regated in education rests upon the abstract institutional right to equal
189. For the realist attack on formalism, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND .PRACrICE 3-41 (1962) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, JURISPRU.
DENCE]; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv.
431 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV, L. REv. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism].
190. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 35-41.
191. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 189, at 1251-56.
192. See TWINING, supra note 86, at 211-27.
193. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 81-131; cf. LLEWE..
LYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 256-60, 447-61 (discussing different ways in
which principle and reason are used in appellate decision making).
194. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHrS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 90-100.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 96-100.
197. Id. at 93-94; see also Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at
220-22 (discussing Dworkin's analysis of rights).
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protection of the laws found in the Fourteenth Amendment.198 Judge
Hercules, when interpreting that clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, should offer a conceptualization or theory of equal protection,
probably based on a background right to equality, which in turn is
based on Hercules's commitment to afford all persons equal respect
and concern.199
Dworkin's grounding of decisions in reasons based on individual
rights and ultimately in political friendship, or in a commitment to
afford all persons equal respect and concern, is a major advance in the
recovery of the person in twentieth century American jurisprudence.
A second major advance is the method he offers in "Hard Cases" and
"Constitutional Cases," chapters 4 and 5 of Taking Rights Seriously,
and in Law's Empire for interpretation of constitutional provisions.
In "Hard Cases" he requires Judge Hercules to develop a theory, un-
derstanding, or conceptualization of contested concepts which would
include, as explained in "Constitutional Cases," the great contested
moral concepts in the United States Constitution.' ° In Law's Empire
he elaborates on the requirement, stated in Taking Rights Seriously,
that Hercules develop a theory for interpretation of the constitution,
our government, and our law that would make the most that can be
made of our institutions.20 1 A worthy theory would be one that has
good institutional fit, that is, it would offer an explanation of our laws
and institutions and their development. 202 Among theories with ade-
quate institutional fit, one could choose the theory which offers the
higher moral interpretation. 203 In Law's Empire, Hercules would
ground his interpretation ultimately in political friendship.2 4 Dwor-
kin's manner of using moral thought, friendship, or respect and con-
cern for persons as the foundation for judicial decisions bears some
resemblance to Bernard Lonergan's discussion of basic horizons and
198. See DwoRurN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOusLY, supra note 25, at 101-05.
199. Id. at 86-116.
200. Id. at 81-131.
201. DWoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25.
202. Id. at 225-75.
203. Id. at 254-58.
204. Id. It is important to note that Dworkin uses a feature called compartmentaliza-
tion in choosing the best interpretation. He states:
If Hercules finds that neither of two principles is flatly contradicted by the acci-
dental damage cases of his jurisdiction, he expands his study into, say, contract
cases to see which of these principles, if either, fits contract decisions better. But
in Hercules's view, if one principle does not fit accident law at all-if it is contra-
dicted by almost every decision in the area that might have confirmed it-this
counts dramatically against it as an eligible interpretation of that body of law ....
Id. at 250-51.
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offers an important, and vital, way of relating personalist thought to
law.
Unfortunately, another aspect of Dworkin's understanding and
use of interpretation requires Hercules to adhere rigorously to his
comprehensive theory or interpretation of law. This erects strong bar-
riers to crossing horizons and to understanding the persons and
problems before the court. Dworkin labels this rigidity in law and
decision making "Integrity."2 5  But this virtue prevents Hercules
from adhering to his fundamental ideal of affording all persons equal
respect and concern. To afford persons respect and concern requires
that one be interested in them and listen to them. It also requires that
one maintain sufficient flexibility to adapt one's actions and decisions
to the needs and problems of the persons one encounters.
Nevertheless, Dworkin has added another important criteria for
assessing proposed theories of law and judicial decision-making meth-
ods, namely whether they are ultimately grounded in political friend-
ship, or respect and concern for persons. One could criticize the crits
because their understandings of law are grounded in narrow political
ideologies rather than in a broad respect and concern for all persons-
individually and collectively.2°6 Apolitical ideology may offer a con-
crete interpretation in a particular society of the advancement of the
common good or the cause of humanity. The ultimate test of such an
interpretation is its impact upon people and their lives. There is little
indication that the crits are prepared to subject their ideologies to that
test. The particular "goods" which they urge may be only partial
goods.2 7 Further, there is a danger that locked within the narrow ho-
rizons of their ideologies they will promote those partial goods despite
the adverse impact upon the lives and rights of individual persons.
Dworkin's concern for individual rights grounded in political friend-
205. Id. at 176-276.
206. The crits and the specialized movements that have developed from them are often
interested in what structure society should have. These movements would use rights to
restructure society and promote different ideological goals. One could criticize the crits,
then, not for the substance of the ideologies that they want to promote; but rather, because
their interest is in the promotion of specific ideologies instead of a broad respect and con-
cem for all persons. See DONNELLY, TiH LANGUAGE AND USEs OF Rxoi-rs, supra note
20, at 87-89, 93-95.
207. See S-UART A. ScImNoLD, THE PoLTcs oF RiGHTS (1974); see also Kennedy,
supra note 24. Duncan Kennedy describes the imaginary case before him in a manner
designed to promote his ideological position. While this may be an appropriate use of
rights for those hammering on foreign horizons, it is inappropriate from the point of view
of a judge. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 87-
88.
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ship, offers an important corrective and ground for assessing proposed
theories of law, government, or judicial decision-making including
those of the crits.
The American pragmatist movement in its various manifestations
offers a negative photographic image of Dworkin's understanding of
law." s In most pragmatist thought there is a deliberate avoidance of
fundamental commitments. 2 9 The distaste for principles of the tradi-
tional sort carries over to principles as commitments to fundamental
values and ideals. While striving to be continually open to the persons
encountered in law or in the course of judicial decision making, the
pragmatists overlook the importance of a fundamental commitment to
persons individually and collectively. A question raised by the prag-
matist tradition is whether such a fundamental commitment to per-
sons itself erects barriers to further intellectual exploration and to the
openness necessary to respond to concrete individuals.210 For Dwor-
kin such barriers appear to be the result of his fundamental commit-
ments. Nevertheless, the problem as stated appears to involve a
contradiction, namely that a commitment to persons prevents one
from being open to the needs and concerns of the persons one en-
counters. Dworkin's rigidity may result from a neo-Kantian21z ' desire
for consistency rather than from his fundamental commitment to re-
spect and concern for persons.21 2
The pragmatist rejection of, or reluctance to use, principles as tra-
ditionally understood was an important step in the twentieth century
recovery of the person. Yet Dworkin's rediscovery of principles as
grounded in respect and concern for the person is indispensable to
relating legal reasoning to persons.2 13 Dworkin's method of interpre-
tation, particularly when applied to understanding the great contested
moral concepts in the United States Constitution, enables us to under-
stand the relationship between persons, legal reasoning, and principles
208. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHrs, supra note 20, at 87-89.
209. See LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 35-45; see also TWINING,
supra note 86 (examining Llewellyn's -use of concepts "situation sense" and "reason").
Lochner v. New York also illustrates a deliberate avoidance of general principles of law.
198 U.S. 45; POSNER, Tim PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 131, at 454-69 (em-
phasizing difficulties of legal system based on formal principle).
210. See POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 131, at 454-69.
211. Dworkin is described as a neo-Kantian because he, like Kant, is an absolutist and a
rationalist. Dworkin believes that we can use reason to work out a consistent set of princi-
ples that cannot be overridden within this age of the law. However, Dworkin differs from
Kant in that Dworkin's theory is not purely duty based.
212. See DwoRN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 116.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 193-205.
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as values, ideals, and commitments related to persons. However, by
uncovering both steps as important to the recovery of the person in
law a dilemma arises: Can we understand and use our fundamental
principles, which seem vital to respect and concern for persons, in a
way which avoids overlooking the persons we encounter in concrete
circumstances and denying them deep respect and concern?
VIII. THE COMMON GOOD
A. Macmurray
Ronald Dworkin, as just described, requires Judge Hercules to
develop a fundamental theory or interpretation grounded in political
friendship or a commitment to afford all persons equal respect and
concern.214 John Macmurray offers the beginnings of such a theory.
215
According to Macmurray, the relationship between persons is found
in action where one encounters resistance, some of which one can per-
ceive as intentional.216 The actor, then, may distinguish between sub-
jects who respond intentionally and objects whose resistance is
unintentional 17 From his understanding of persons in relation
through action, Macmurray develops a theory of indirect relations
which offers a clue to an interpretation of society grounded in political
friendship.218
In every relation between persons, each person is both subject
and object.219 One can choose to regard the other solely as object
and, hence, as impersonal.220 By refusing the personal relationship
one can emphasize the objective aspects of the other, denying his free-
dom and intentionality as another actor.221 Normally, the objective
aspects of a relation are for the sake of the person in which each treats
the other as a person, as one who acts freely and intentionally. 22
However, one can reverse the dominance of the subjective over the
objective.2' In slavery, for example, the master regards the slave not
as a free, intentional actor, but as an object who possesses certain per-
214. See supra text accompanying notes 193-205.
215. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9.
216. Id. at 16-18, 79-82.
217. Id. at 79-82.
218. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9; MACMURRAY, THE SELF
AS AGENT, supra note 9.
219. See MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION, supra note 9, at 25-29, 160-61.
220. Id. at 29-31.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 30-43.
223. Id.
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sonal characteristics which render him useful.224 While the master
perceives the slave as both subject and object, the objective aspects
dominate the subjective.' - Macmurray argues that "the impersonal
attitude is justifiable when it is itself subordinated to the personal atti-
tude, when it is adopted for the sake of the personal, and is itself in-
cluded as a negative which is necessary to the positive.
' '72 6
Thus, the ideal of the personal "is a universal community of per-
sons in which each cares for all the others" since the "self-realization
of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively moti-
vated towards every other person with whom he is in relation." 7 In
principle, one's relation with the Other must be inclusive rather than
narrow and confined to those whom one prefers.22 This ideal is at
least theoretically achievable when one has direct relations with
others. In order to emphasize the personal rather than the objective
aspects of a relation, one must limit one's activities in order to pre-
serve the interests of others, particularly their freedom as independent
actors.2 9 Unless one intends to preserve the other's freedom, one is
subordinating the personal aspects of the relation and negating the
Other as one who intentionally acts.230 When in communication or
direct relation with others, sensible limitation to preserve their free-
dom and interests is possibleI3' When the relationship is indirect, as
it necessarily must be with the majority of persons in society, it is diffi-
cult to understand which limitations make sense and will actually pre-
serve the freedom and interests of others.
Through a discussion of indirect relations, 2 Macmurray is able
to propose the beginnings of a personalist theory of political obliga-
tion and justice. The political obligation "is a derivative and indirect
moral obligation." 3 Justice is a restraint which one person accepts
on his own power and action for the sake of preserving the freedom
and interests of others. 34 Justice is ultimately for the sake of friend-
ship, for preserving the ideal of a universal community, and the ideal
for each individual of positive motivation towards each person he is
224. Id. at 34-35.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 35.
227. Id. at 159.
228. Id.
229. Ild. at 30-43.
230. Id.
231. I&
232. Id. at 186-205.
233. IM at 196.
234. Id. at 190-91, 201.
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related to directly or indirectly.3 5 Law, in turn, arises when there is a
claim of injustice. 36 Courts of law make the adjustments, including
changes of custom necessary to reestablish justice3 7 Justice is "the
minimum of morality which can be demanded as necessary to the co-
operation of free agents."" 8 Without it we cannot cooperate in soci-
ety and maintenance of the ideal becomes impossible?3 9
Macmurray, then, offers a clue to grounding a theory of law, jus-
tice, or government in an understanding of persons in relation. A the-
ory of justice, however, requires a more elaborate foundation, perhaps
related to Macmurray's insights. Dworkin on occasion has offered
Rawls's Theory of Justice as a sophisticated interpretation of modern
society grounded-as Dworkin would perceive-in a commitment to
afford all persons equal respect and concern.2 40 Karol Wojtyla who,
like Macmurray, perceives a person primarily as one who acts, offers
in his book, The Acting Person,241 an understanding of the common
good which in some respects remarkably resembles Rawls's theory.
B. Persons Acting Together-Wojtyla, Rawls
In The Acting Person, Karol Wojtyla offers an understanding of
the common good as persons acting together.242 Actions contrary to
the common good could be defined as those that tend to destroy or
seriously interfere with the common action and as those that prevent
the participation of any particular person in that action. 43 Participa-
tion in action with others is a rich concept in Wojtyla's thought. One
can participate in society's common action in a variety of ways: intel-
lectually, economically, through the experience of work, and politi-
cally. In The Acting Person, Wojtyla offers an understanding of
political opposition as a form of participation in the common action
and hence as contributing to the common good.244 In Wojtyla's
thought, one develops as a person through action, as for example, one
grows through work.?' Acting or working with others helps one to
235. Id. at 204-05.
236. Id. at 202.
237. Id. at 202-03.
238. Id. at 204.
239. Id.
240. See DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 179-83.
241. See WonYLA, supra note 7.
242. Id. at 281-82.
243. Id. at 280-91.
244. Id. at 284-87.
245. Id. at 265.
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develop more fully as a person.24 Understanding oneself and the
Other through common action differs from the Sartrean definition of
oneself under the Look and by nihilating the Look of the Other. 47
The experience of growth through common action contrasts with Mac-
murray's recognition of the Other through perception of an in-
tentional resistance to one's action. -4 According to Wojtyla, one
perceives oneself and the Other as person through the experience of
cooperative intentional action.24 9
The common good, defined as persons acting together, offers the
beginning of a model from which one could generate a theory or inter-
pretation of society of the sort Dworkin requires of Judge Hercules 50
Dworkin suggests that Rawls's Theory of Justice offers such an inter-
pretation of society and could serve as a foundation for Hercules's
more particular conceptualizations of the great contested moral con-
cepts in the United States Constitution such as due process, equal pro-
tection, freedom of speech, and cruel and unusual punishment?25'
Rawls's Theory of Justice2 2 is in some respects similar to
Wojtyla's model of the common good and provides some patterns
which could be employed in developing that model. Rawls imagines
an original position with multiple contracting parties negotiating an
agreement regarding the principles of justice for their society.253 The
agreement is arrived at under the veil of ignorance which conceals
from the parties their own projects in life and their own advantages
and disadvantages254 The principles agreed to will protect all persons
in the pursuit of their rational projects in life.5 5 A measure of the
principles is whether they tend to maximize everyone's shares of the
primary social goods and to minimize the worst disasters, defined as
large or total losses of the primary social goods?5 6 Rawls would de-
fine the primary social goods as those necessary to the pursuit of any
246. Id. at 271.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 219-41.
249. See WoirYLA, supra note 7, at 11.
250. See DwoRuN, LAW'S EMPiRE, supra note 25, at 45-113.
251. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 87.
252. For a summary of Rawls's theory, see Samuel J. M. Donnelly, A Theory of Justice,
Judicial Methodology, and the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment: Rawls, Dworkin,
and a Theory of Criminal Responsibility, 29 SYRACUSE L. Rlv. 1109, 1117-26 (1978) [here-
inafter Donnelly, A Theory of Justice].
253. See RAwLs, supra note 70, at 60-65, 118, 150-61.
254. Id. at 12, 136-42.
255. Id. at 90-95, 142-50; see also id. at 64-65 (discussing "expectations").
256. Id. at 396-99, 433-39, 447 (explaining Rawls's "Thin Theory of Good").
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rational life plan and would include among them life, liberty, self-re-
spect, and a modicum of wealth. 7
One developing an understanding of the common good as per-
sons acting together might define fundamental social goods as those
necessary to allow minimal economic and political participation in the
common action of society. The primary principles of justice, then,
would be those that would protect and promote participation in the
common action and guard against elimination of any particular per-
son's or group's participation in that common action. Important poli-
•cies, in Dworkin's sense of political reasons related to group
advantage,258 also would emerge from reflection on society as persons
acting together. Such policies would promote and advance the com-
mon action and resist interference with or destruction of that action.
This developing model for interpreting society would be grounded in
deep respect and concern for persons and their relationships with one
another. One who has respect and concern for persons should hold
that regard for both the totality of persons acting together in society
and for each particular person participating in the common action.
Both the policies and principles which emerge from this model of the
common good would be grounded in regard for the person. The prin-
ciples and policies adopted through use of the model would promote
Macmurray's ideal of "a universal community of persons in which
each cares for all the others."259
The more dynamic model of the common good, as persons acting
together, offers advantages when compared with Rawls's static model.
It allows the development of a Dworkian interpretation of a particular
society for the sake of protecting the personal despite the objective
,aspects of what Macmurray describes as indirect relations260 in a large
community of persons. In addition, this model can serve as a guide-
line for day-to-day common sense actions, in Lonergan's understand-
ing,26' in the conduct of political affairs., One's actions as a judge
should be guided by a concern for preserving the common action and
for protecting the participation of each individual in that action. In-
deed, because of the dynamic nature of the model of the common
good, a judge accepting its guidance should continue to grow, to de-
velop morally and intellectually in order to cross horizons, and to
257. Id. at 62, 92.
258. See supra text accompanying note 195.
259. MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 159.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 231-39.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96, 106-18.
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reach out to others to allow, preserve, and protect their ability to par-
ticipate in the common action.
In resemblance to Rawls, and indeed, drawing on his inspira-
tion,2 2 one could use the model of the common good as persons act-
ing together to generate a theory of rights. A fundamental right
would be to participate in the common action. Primary rights would
protect against deprivation of the personal, economic, and political
goods necessary to basic participation in any society's, and in this par-
ticular society's, common action.
If one were interpreting the United States Constitution, one then
would examine the history, tradition, and structure of our government
and develop an interpretation of the constitution generally that would
meet Dworkin's two tests: good institutional fit and a higher moral
interpretation. 63 The argument for the interpretation that makes the
moral best of the constitution would rest upon the interpretation's re-
flection of an understanding of the common good as persons acting
together and of actions contrary to the common good as those which
tend to destroy the common action or to prevent or inhibit the partici-
pation of any person in that action.
In turn, the general theory or interpretation of the constitution
would become the foundation for theories of each constitutional pro-
vision. And, as in Dworkin's understanding of rights as reasons,2"
these theories of particular provisions would become the reasons for
holdings in concrete cases. One should ask how this interpretation
differs from that of Dworkin. It, of course, uses much of Dworkin's
method while offering a slightly different foundation. However, un-
like Dworkin,265 this interpretation grounds both principles, as rea-
sons for decisions based on individual right, and policies, as reasons
for decisions based on group advantage, in the fundamental theory
that is the common good. Principles must be weighed against policies.
Only strong principles-those which protect the primary social goods
and the opportunity of each individual to participate basically in the
common action of society-would automatically trump strong poli-
cies. Further, since the understanding of the common good as persons
acting together is a dynamic conception, the judge using it to interpret
the constitution never would rest contentedly with his present under-
262. See Donnelly, A Theory of Justice, supra note 252.
263. See DwoRKIN, LAw's EMiPRE, supra note 25, at 225-75; DwoRIN, TA ING
RIGHrS SERioUSLY, supra note 25, at 81-131.
264. See DwoRKN, TAKING RIGHs SERiOUSLY, supra note 25, at 81-131.
265. See id.
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standing. In the tradition of Lonergan, the inquiry would proceed and
the judge would have a strong commitment to crossing horizons.
A further difference arises from the traditional liberal distaste for
a full theory of the good.266 That distaste may be perceived in Dwor-
kin's focus on rights rather than policies, supporting the individual
rather than group advantage. One also may recognize that distaste for
a full theory of the good in Rawls, who offers instead a sufficient thin
theory of the good to support a theory of the right.267 While the the-
ory of the common good offered above follows Rawls in recognizing
primary social goods necessary to participation in any society or in this
society, it has a place for a fuller theory of the good which is continu-
ally developing as the inquiry proceeds. Actions which would tend to
destroy or seriously interfere with the common action would be con-
trary to the common good and would be accounted for in constitu-
tional interpretation. Policies as reasons supporting a judge's decision
would be grounded in a concern for the common action and would
support proposals that promote that common action. In sum, the the-
ory of the common good is grounded ultimately in respect and con-
cern for persons in particular and their relations with others, and with
persons generally as collectively, albeit indirectly, related to each
other in society.
C. Finnis
Any discussion of a full theory of the good must account for John
Fimnis's analysis, in Natural Law and Natural Rights, of the basic
goods necessary for human flourishing.268 The goods, he contends,
which are self-evidently good and not reducible to other goods, are
life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical rea-
sonableness, and religion.269 Other instrumental goods would pro-
mote these basic aspects of human flourishing.270 While Finnis is
offering a premoral theory of human flourishing, one could develop a
theory of rights from Finnis's list of basic goods by adding a human or
moral commitment to the flourishing of each individual. To totally or
substantially deny any of these basic goods to an individual person
would be to deny his fundamental human rights. This understanding
of fundamental human rights then could serve as a basis for offering
266. See RAWLS, supra note 70, at 396-99, 433-39, 447.
267. IM
268. JoHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-99 (1980).
269. Id. at 85-90.
270. Id. at 90-91.
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an interpretation of the protection of rights and of particular rights in
the United States Constitution. A possible check upon Finnis's per-
ception regarding basic goods would be to ask whether we would con-
sider it fundamentally wrong to deny an individual person all access to
the goods listed by him. Other goods also may be discovered by use
of that test. Perhaps some of the goods so discovered would be of
basic importance for human flourishing in our society but not another.
Promotion of the basic goods listed by Finnis also would enhance
society. For example, while it may be fundamentally wrong to deny a
particular person or group all access to knowledge, it correspondingly
would be good to promote knowledge and access to it in society.
While resource allocation is important, neglect of certain fundamental
goods, perhaps those in F'mnis's list, would lead to serious deteriora-
tion of human flourishing in general. Finnis's list then contributes to
an understanding of sound public policy as well as a foundation for
generating a theory of rights.
Nevertheless, it is enlightening to compare Finnis's analysis with
the formulas offered by Rawls and WoJtyla for locating the primary
social goods. Rawls would ask what goods are necessary to pursue
any rational plan in life,271 while one using Wojtyla's definition of the
common good could inquire what goods are necessary to participate
in the common human action.272 Wojtyla's definition, focusing not
only on human action in general but the particular common action in
this society, could be used to generate lists of goods important to par-
ticipation at the moment in this society. Rawls's list, while overlap-
ping with that generated by Wojtyla's definition, would differ from
that of Finnis's.
Comparing Rawls, Fmnis and Wojtyla highlights the need for
conversation and crossing horizons in order to understand the basic
needs of people in particular societies. One committed to respect and
concern for persons should not maintain a closed list of primary social
goods.
D. Summary
Wojtyla's understanding of the common good as persons acting
together provides the central insight for a personalist theory that will
relate a judge's fundamental commitment to persons in relation to
each other to an understanding of rights in the United States Constitu-
271. See supra text accompanying notes 252-56.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49.
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tion. Actions in violation of the common good are those that tend to
destroy the common action or to eliminate or substantially inhibit the
participation of any particular person in society's action.273 A theory
of fundamental rights, which a judge may use in interpreting the con-
stitutional protections for rights, may be construed on the basis of that
understanding of actions contrary to the common good. Construction
of the theory requires discussion of primary goods necessary to partic-
ipation in society. Both Rawls and Finnis offer lists of goods that
could be considered primary.274 The disregard of those goods would
tend not only to disintegrate the common action but also to harm indi-
vidual participation in society. To deprive an individual of a reason-
able share of any of these goods would be to treat the individual
primarily as an object rather than a person. To protect each individ-
ual's share of the primary goods by a theory of rights and to promote
participation in society is to follow Macmurray's desire to preserve the
dominance of the personal over the objective despite the indirect rela-
tions of persons in society.27 A judge could adapt Dworkin's
method276 when employing this theory to interpret the great contested
moral concepts in the United States Constitution. The judge should
recognize, however, that Wojtyla's theory of the common good ex-
presses concern for the common action as well as the participation of
each person.277 Rights as reasons, then, must be weighed against poli-
cies as reasons, although strong rights directly related to the primary
social goods would trump strong policies.278 The judge also should
recognize the dynamic nature of the definition. The common action in
which the judge is participating continues despite the theory of rights
constructed by the judge. Theory is secondary to, and for the sake of,
action. The theory of rights provides a guide to protecting particular
persons and their ability to participate in the common action. The
judge, by crossing horizons among other means, must be continually
alert to the impact of his holdings, including those interpreting consti-
tutional protections for rights, on persons and their relations.279 That
ongoing concrete concern for persons may lead to the discovery of
new primary goods necessary to participation in the concrete circum-
stances of this society.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 242-44.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 255-57, 268-72.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 226-39.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 199-206, 260-68.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 242-46.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 118-22, 164-68.
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IX. PLURALISM, HORIZONS, AND RHETORIC
A pluralist society, which may be defined as one with multiple
horizons, poses a substantial challenge to a judge with a commitment
. to respect and concern for persons. Without consciousness of hori-
zons, with their vision-creating and vision-blocking aspects, and- a
method that allows the crossing of horizons, the task of respect and
concern for persons may be nearly impossible for a judge.in a pluralist
society. When abstracted from the many horizon-crossing activities
that people actually engage in, the task of relating persons in a plural-
ist society may appear formidable and perhaps impossible' Since peo-
ple are related through language and action, one must find ways of
relating both language and action to the means for crossing horizons.
James Boyd White's understanding of law as rhetoric offers a ba-
sis for discussing the relations of persons through law in a pluralist
society.8 0 While White emphasizes the language aspects of law,
enough has been said in this Article to show that the language of law
is for the sake of action. 8 1 White sees society as constituted by the
ongoing argument, partially through law, regarding what society ought
to be3 That vision could be developed so that law, which is both
language and action, is an important means for relating persons in dif-
fering horizons to each other. A passage from Heracles' Bow makes
the point:
[T]he law as I describe it becomes a repository of shared ex-
periences, a set of experiments and trials and failures, which
are by the law made intelligible and, sharable. This is a cul-
ture of experience and experiment; it is a way of giving expe-
rience to ourselves, individually and collectively, the
experience of making and remaking language under pres-
sure. For in the law, our language of facts and law is con-
stantly being tested against the real world, against common
sentiment, against cases and argument, and being remade in
light of what is discovered. This means that the law is a way
in which the community defines itself, not once and for all,
but over and over, and in the process it educates itself about
its own character and the nature of the world.8 3
280. See WHrrE, HERACLEs' Bow, supra note 72.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
282. See WHrE, HERAcLES' Bow, supra note 72, at 28, 32-35, 37.
283. Id. at 225.
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The various views, positions, cultures, and groups in society that
engage regularly, through law, in argument about the remaking of so-
ciety are related in one society that is constituted by high discussion
about what society should be.284 The ongoing argument is language;
but it is language about action, and indeed about the common action,
which is society.
To allow the activity, which is law, to function best in relating
persons in multiple horizons to the common action of society, law
should function for those engaged in the activity of law, such as
judges, as a means of transcending and crossing horizons. I have
noted the advantages of a comprehensive theory like Dworkin re-
quires of Judge Hercules, for transcending horizons and protecting
rights.2s8 The law itself is a means of transcending the multiple cul-
tural horizons in society. I also have noted the dangers of a rigid ide-
ology for recognition and respect for persons and their rights.8 6
Those rights and persons who are not accounted for by the ideology
will be ignored.287 However, every worked-out theory, even one such
as Dworkin's constructed on the foundation of respect and concern
for persons, will establish a new horizon with both vision-enhancing
and vision-blocking characteristics and may be said to constitute an
ideology.2s8 Legal methods then require horizon-crossing techniques
to allow law to work well in relating persons in differing horizons to
the common action of society. 8 9
Law understood as rhetoric,29° as the ongoing argument between
those in differing horizons which constitutes society, contains, or per-
haps suggests, an important means for crossing horizons, that is, by
argument or conversation. Argument is a means of establishing con-
versation, of seeking recognition for one's views and for oneself as a
person, and for those within one's horizon as persons.291 It is a way of
284. See id. at xii; see also DONNELLY, LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20,
at 43-46 (discussing various approaches to law as rhetoric).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 175-77; see also Donnelly, Principles, Per-
sons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 257-59 (arguing that comprehensive theory, rigor-
ously applied, can be means for transcending horizons and keeping political, cultural, and
social predilictions in check).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 159-64.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 175-84.
288. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 266-70.
289. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 50-55.
290. See WHrrnE, HnRAcLEs' Bow, supra note 72, at xii-xiii.
291. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsEs OF RiomTs, supra note 20, at 82-95.
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knocking, or perhaps hammering, on the door of foreign horizons
seeking recognition and participation.29
Dworkin's method for interpreting the great contested moral
concepts in the United States Constitution offers both a method and
an understanding of how conversation takes place through constitu-
tional litigation and decision making between those in differing hori-
zons in our society.293 In "Hard Cases," chapter 4 of Taking Rights
Seriously, Dworkin requires Judge Hercules to offer a theory or con-
ceptualization of each contested concept in the constitution which is
grounded ultimately in Hercules's vision or interpretation of our soci-
ety, law, and government2 9 4 Each conceptualization must justify not
only the particular decisions which Hercules wants to make but also
the clear core instances, or cases, on which everyone is agreed and the
concept itself.295 Employing Dworkin's method, judges with differing
visions, or with different horizons, should offer a conceptualization
which interprets the concept and supports the clear core instances of
the concept as well as justifies their particular decision. Thus, they are
necessarily in conversation. 296 The decisions of judges using Dwor-
kin's method, however much their visions or horizons differ, will nev-
ertheless overlap since each is offering an interpretation or
justification of the same concept and the clear core instances on which
all agree.2 7 Dworkin's model of the intellectual conversation that
ought to take place in the United States Supreme Court may not be
far distant from the reality. Judges with differing visions and under-
standings of law are interpreting the same constitutional provisions
and exchanging thoughts and arguments. To the extent the justices
represent different horizons in our pluralist society, those horizons are
engaged in conversation and argument through constitutional decision
making. That conversation between differing segments of our society
would be enhanced if the Court were a balanced Court with represen-
tation from differing views and horizons. Nevertheless, constitutional
litigation and the tradition of legal argument puts those from differing
horizons in high intellectual argument and discussion with each other
in the ongoing argument or conversation about what our society ought
292. Id. at 47-55.
293. See DwoluuN, TA NG RIGHrs SERiousLY, supra note 25, at 81-131.
294. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 200.
295. DwolRN, TAXING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY, supra note 25 at 106-07, 135-37; see also
Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 221-22 (defining conceptual-
ization and explaining its process).
296. See DwoRUN, TmNrc RiGrrHs SprIoUsLY, supra note 25, at 313-17.
297. Id.
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to be. The views of Dworkin and White may be melded and each
would benefit from the other's insights; White from Dworkin's depth
of principle and theory of interpretation, and Dworkin from White's
understanding of law as rhetoric, as the ongoing argument about what
society should be, which constitutes society and relates persons in
multiple horizons to the common action.298
Lonergan offers a method for relating what he calls positions and
counterpositions that could be employed in the ongoing conversation
or argument which constitutes society.299 For Lonergan, insight is an
important moment in all intellectual activity." Those who do not
share my particular horizons or my theories and fundamental posi-
tions, which themselves constitute horizons, nevertheless may have in-
sights which I may perceive as valuable. I may understand those
insights and their value better if I cross horizons sufficiently to per-
ceive how those with differing views relate their insights to the circum-
stances of their horizons and their fundamental positions. I then may
share and participate in the creative insights of those in other horizons
by extracting those insights from their setting and relating them to my
horizon and my fundamental positions.
Hart employs a technique, in the course of the many philosophi-
cal conversations he has engaged in, that resembles the process just
described in Lonergan's thought. Hart will learn from those he en-
gages in conversation, will take an important clarifying concept or in-
sight from their thought, rename it, and find a place for it in his
thought.30 1 For example, perhaps the best way to understand the cen-
tral chapters of the Concept of Law is to perceive them as conversa-
tions with Holmes and the legal realists.302  Llewellyn often
emphasized the leeways in law, as well as his view, that the law is
constantly in flux.30 3 Hart transforms Llewellyn's notion of leeways
298. See DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsEs OF RiGHTS, supra note 20, at 45.
299. See LONERGAN, INsrGHT, supra note 8, at 387-90, 488-514; see also TRAcy, supra
note 10, at 151-55 (discussing Lonergan's position and counterposition methodology).
300. See LONERGAN, INsiGHT, supra note 8.
301. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, An Inaugural Lec-
ture Delivered Before the University of Oxford (May 30, 1953), in 70 LAW. Q. Rnv. 37
(1954).
302. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 217-18. Hart has
had celebrated exchanges with Lon Fuller and with the Scandanavian legal realists. One
could also argue that some of his basic concepts are an attempt to relate analytical thought
to American legal realism. See also DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND UsEs OF RxoHTs,
supra note 20, at 12-17 (explaining Hart's method of emphasizing choice rather than rigid
rules).
303. See LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 62-120; cf. Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, Address Delivered to the Annual
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into the open texture of law and legal concepts, concepts with a clear
core meaning but surrounded by a shadowy or penumbral area where
the concept may or may not apply.3 4 Since law, as Hart perceives it,
inevitably is and ought to be open-textured, with judges. as deputy leg-
islators designated by rules of recognition, change, and adjudication to
specify the rules within the penumbral area, Hart has captured in ana-
lytical form Llewellyn's understanding of law in flux with an emphasis
on judicial creation of law.30 5 Hart's transformation of Hans Kelsen's
grundnorm30 6 into his own rule of recognition is another well-known
instance of his acceptance of an insight which he includes in his own
system of thought.30 7
The technique of acquiring insights from foreign horizons ex-
plained by Lonergan, and perhaps exemplified by Hart, offers the pos-
sibility of conversation and occasional convergence between those in
differing horizons. Conversation through law and constitutional litiga-
tion and decision making, particularly if judges :use a combination of
Dworkin's method and horizon-crossing techniques, offers further
possibilities of convergence between the views of those from different
horizons. For example, judges who offer different conceptualizations
of contested constitutional concepts may find that their differing inter-
pretations will support the same results in particular cases.308 They
also may borrow freely from each other's insights.
The liberal distaste for a full theory of the good may rest not only
on bad historical experience but also on a recognition of our limited
knowledge and understanding.30 9 The liberal emphasis on human
rights, then, represents not only respect and concern for each individ-
ual, an important rediscovery of the Enlightenment, but also a distrust
for theories of the good which may trample the individual.310 Argua-
bly, the theory of the common good proposed in the last segment ac-
Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices (1959), in LLEWELLYN, JURIsPRUDENCE, supra
note 189, at 215-29 (using flexibility in United States Supreme Court decisions as demon-
stration of law in flux).
304. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961) [hereinafter HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW].
305. Id. at 123-32; see also DONNELLY, THE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra
note 20, at 12-17 (explaining Hart's method of emphasizing choice rather than rigid rules).
. 306. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 8-10, 193-95 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed.
1967).
307. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 304, at 92-107.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 293-98.
.309. See RAwLs, supra note 70, at 395-99.
310. See Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, supra note 139.
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counts for these concerns.311 It has a place for a strong theory of
rights based on the concern for participation of each person in the
common action of this society.312 As a dynamic theory, it recognizes
the ongoing action, the moral growth and development of each person
in relation to others, and the development and change in society.
313
When related to Lonergan's understanding of horizons and of the per-
son as engaged in ongoing inquiry with deep drives to know and to
love, the theory of the common good has a grasp of the decision
maker's limited knowledge and understanding and a strong commit-
ment to and methodology for crossing horizons. A developing and
changing full theory of the good can then be offered despite the liberal
distaste for such theories. The full theory of the good is for the sake
of the common action and is grounded in the goods that will promote
human flourishing.314 The theory, briefly sketched in the last segment,
is offered as a contribution to the ongoing conversation and argument
in our pluralist society that constitutes our society.315 When fully
worked out it will be an ideology with corresponding vision-creating
and vision-blocking characteristics. Nevertheless, it is grounded in a
desire to fully understand, respect, and appreciate persons and is com-
mitted to development, conversation, and horizon crossing. The ideo-
logical aspects of the theory must yield continually to the fundamental
commitment to respect and concern for persons and to the exigencies
of understanding newly developed from the ongoing inquiry, the de-
veloping common action, and the continuing conversation and horizon
crossing.316 Ideologies and understandings of law which cannot meet
these tests are exposed to liberal criticism based on distaste for a full
theory of the good. Such ideologes are subject to further criticism
from a personalist as well as a liberal perspective, if they are prepared
to override human rights for the sake of their narrow vision of the
good.
Nevertheless, as experience testifies, human conduct is prone to
evil;317 evil inclinations often will overcome good intentions and theo-
ries. There is, then, a deep, and perhaps desperate need for the ongo-
ing argument in a pluralist society about what society should be.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 214-79.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 273-79.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 260-62, 273-79.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 260-63, 273-79.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 214-79.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79.
317. Regrettably, examples are not difficult to find: the Holocaust, slavery, Watergate,
et cetera.
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There also is a need for one important aspect of that argument, which
could be described as the use of rights as rhetoric, rights discourse,
and litigation, as part of the conversation which constitutes society.
318
One significant use of rights rhetoric and litigation is to hammer on
the doors of foreign horizons, and of society, to demand recognition
for oneself or one's clients as persons entitled to participate in the
common action.319 In the course of that conversation and litigation,
old horizons may need to be deconstructed in order to allow new vi-
sion. The crits have made an important contribution to the ongoing
conversation and argument which constitutes society by their empha-
sis on deconstruction of establishment horizons.320  Narrative, as
Robin West points out, can serve a similar function to rights rhetoric
in knocking on the doors of foreign horizons and encouraging or de-
manding that horizons be crossed.32'
When a society, as perhaps ours has done, provides normal vehi-
cles or institutions for rights discourse and litigation it has provided an
important means for the ongoing conversation which constitutes soci-
ety. It has also provided for recognition of, and participation in, soci-
ety by persons who might otherwise be overlooked within current
horizons and who might be trampled upon by currently popular theo-
ries of the good. Society then has established a methodology which
meets the personalist test of respect and concern for persons and
Lonergan's desire for continuing the inquiry and posing ever further
questions.
X. THE AuT mTc JUDGE, IS SEARCH AND JUSTIFICATION
A. The Search
In American jurisprudence the central figure is the judge and the
central aspect of law is the public dispute settlement process which
takes place in our courts. Understanding the judge as a person, then,
is vital to a personalist theory of law.32 That theory should offer an
318. See generally DONNELLY, Trk LANGUAGE AND USES OF RiGO-rs, supra note 20, at
43-45 (describing rights as "significant means by which persons establish, change, talk
about, fight about, reconcile, and struggle with human relations"); WHr=r, HERAcLEs'
Bow, supra note 72 (examiming law as social, cultural, rhetorical, and literary activity).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75; see also 'Ibshnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down, supra note 139 (analyzing theories of interpretivism and neutral principles and
their close association with liberal political philosophy).
321. See Robin West, Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem
Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 145 (1985) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence as Narrative].
322. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
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understanding of the judge as a person engaged through the dispute
settlement process in relationship with other persons-those who ap-
pear before him, fellow judges, and indirectly, with all persons.
323
Martin Heidegger speaks of a person being thrown into a
world.324 That metaphor aptly describes the experience of our youth
when we first began to think about and sort out our universe. But it
also describes well our experience in the typical American law school,
particularly, but not exclusively, in the first year of law school. We
plunge into the pool of law, pretend that we can swim, and then find
that we can manage. Although we gradually make the law our own,
we know that we did not construct this world, nor is it altogether to
our liking. It is a world that has been 800 or more years in the mak-
ing, both in England and in the United States. Reflecting on law as an
inherited culture, James Boyd White comments:
For me it follows that the law is best regarded not as a
kind of social science but as one of the humanities. Its prac-
tice requires a constant sense of the resources and limits of
one's language and culture; a conscious attention to the si-
lence against which all language action takes place, to what
cannot be said; an awareness of one's own need for an edu-
cation, particularly for an education from the past that has
created our linguistic and intellectual inheritance; a recogni-
tion that it is our responsibility to preserve and improve this
inheritance, leaving it fit for use by others; an acknowledge-
ment that the authority of this inheritance is at once real and
tentative; and an awareness that others, who are also users of
language, composers of texts, and members of communities,
are entitled to basic respect as autonomous and equal per-
sons. All these things mark it as an essentially practical and
literary, rather than scientific or theoretical activity.
3Z
When first appointed or elected, judges must experience a similar
phenomenon of being thrown into a world. While their human exper-
iences, including their lives as attorneys are very relevant, the world in
which they find themselves is in some respects altogether new. New
judges regularly experience intellectual excitement, with joy and with
concern for their new insight of responsibility they begin to sort
through their world. Lonergan describes an ongoing process of in-
323. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
324. See MARTIN HEIDEGER, BEING AND TimE 191-93 (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., 1962).
325. See Wnrm, HERAcLES' Bow, supra note 72, at xii.
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quiry of which the new judge's experience is an instance, a process
of raising and answering relevant questions and then raising yet fur-
ther questions perhaps on a higher plane. 26 In the course of the in-
quiry the judge will frame tentative theories not merely of substantive
areas of law, but of the role as judge and of law as a human phenome-
non. Some of our best judges have been important jurisprudential
thinkers. 27
Law, however, is not a purely intellectual inquiry. Law is action;
law is relationship with persons.32s Judges notoriously are-practical
persons concerned with action and with the impact of their decisions
on society and on the persons who appear before them. As a new
judge sorts his way through his world he may create new commitments
or strengthen and expand old ones. Lonergan would describe the pro-
cess of inquiry and perhaps conversion, as the product of the drive to
know and to love.3 2 9
David Granfield, speaking of the lives and searches of lawyers in
general, contrasts the authentic and inauthentic person as follows:
Judges, lawyers, professors, and even law students develop a
characteristic mentality. Law transforms them for better or
worse. If it remains merely a job, a prestigious way of mak-
ing a living, a sophisticated, dialectical skill, or a springboard
to a position of power and influence, it splits their life into
uncoordinated personal and professional compartments.
The result is that one may become worldly wise without be-
ing truly wise; true wisdom keeps asking relevant questions
while trying to verify and unify insights and to integrate all of
life's experiences.330
One finds a remarkably similar passage in Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.'s The Path of the Law:
And happiness, I am sure from having known many success-
ful men, cannot be won simply by being counsel for great
corporations and having an income of fifty thousand dollars.
An intellect great enough to win the prize needs other food
beside success. The remoter and more general aspects of the
326. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 272-75; LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOL-
OGY, supra note 8, at 162-65; TRAcy, supra note 10, at 9-10, 125-26.
327. For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Jerome Frank, Benjamin Cardozo, and
William Brennan.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 45-65.
329. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 596, 658-59; LONERGAN, METHOD IN
THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 237-44; TRAcy, supra note 10, at 191, 237.
330. See GRANHmta, supra note 76, at 274: -
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law are those which give it universal interest. It is through
them that you not only become a great master in your call-
ing, but connect your subject with the universe and catch an
echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a
hint of the universal law.331
A personalist understanding of law must rest on an account simi-
lar to the one just sketched of the authentic judge and his search. The
search will be an ongoing inquiry and effort to relate persons through
the law and the judicial decision-making process. Given the multiple
horizons of a pluralist society and the autonomy of the human person,
the judge's search will be continuous and its outcomes multiple and
unpredictable. Nevertheless, a personalist account of law and the ju-
dicial decision-making process must accept that search as an essential
backdrop for whatever methods, theories, or principles it offers.
Recognizing that backdrop, a very recent controversy in law,
namely that occasioned by the antifoundationalism of neo-pragma-
tism, should be briefly addressed.332 The personalism described in this
article is nonfoundational in certain traditional senses. To the extent
that a personalist judge would choose to follow classic Thomist natural
law, the judge would arrive at conclusions by human reason.33 As
Dworkin once remarked, there may be a secret book in the sky but we
do not have access to it.334 Nor would a personalist thinker, in the
manner of Ren6 Descartes, seek a single position such as cogito ergo
sum from which everything else could be derived. 35 While Lonergan
is influenced by Immanuel Kant, his general intellectual method does
not proceed by way of deduction from a priori positions. 336 Inasmuch
as it rejects the three foundational positions just described, personalist
thought could be described as antifoundational. Lonergan's descrip-
tion of general intellectual method draws upon several established
331. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 478 (1897).
332. A good discussion of the controversy surrounding antifoundationalism can be
found in Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND
SocIry 247-74 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
333. See generally GEORGES VAN RImT, THOMiSTIC EPISTEMOLOGY (Donald G. McCar-
thy & George E. Hertrich trans., 1982) (discussing objectivity of ideas as basis for
judgment).
334. See Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. Rtv. 165 (1982).
335. See, e.g., RENA DscATEs, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PmLosopHy (George Heifer-
nan ed. & trans., 1990).
336. But see LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 319-47 (discussing self-affirmation of
knower), 564-68 (discussing heuristic notion of universal viewpoint); LONEROAN, METHOD
IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 38-39 (discussing authentic person and judgments of value);
TRAcT, supra note 10, at 132-82 (discussing basic horizons).
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methods, particularly the scientific method, as models3 37 In this sense
his general intellectual method, when employed in personalist
thought, has a strongly empirical flavor. Nevertheless, Lonergan's un-
derstanding of method avoids the mistake of slavishly applying the
scientific or any other imperialist method in all areas of inquiry.338
Rather, Lonergan offers a fundamental critique of method and of any
particular method by which the usefulness of that method for the
ongoing inquiry may be assessed. 339 Recognizing the phenomenon of
horizons, personalist thought would be wary of an overly rigid devel-
opment and application of a general theory of law or of any particular
legal principle. Nevertheless, personalism would have a role for legal
principles as helpful generalizations, or as representing important
commitments and ideals. Unlike Judge Posner's approach to genera-
lized method, personalism would not reject all overarching theory.'
See, for example, the discussion above of the common good and the
application of that theory in a pluralist society.341 Personalism, never-
theless, emphasizes the importance of understanding the human
person in context and the influence of horizons on the judge's
perception? 42
Important to personalism, however, is the value of and commit-
ment to each and every person. Dworkin's desire to afford each per-
son equal respect and concern and to relate that fundamental
principle to the structuring and understanding of law has deep appeal
to personalist thought. Macmurray's contention that the "self-realiza-
tion of any individual person is only fully achieved if he is positively
motivated towards every other person with whom he is in relation"
' 3
is at the heart of personalist thought. In the indirect relations of a
complex political community one accepts restraints on one's power
and action for the sake of preserving the freedom and interests of
others.344 Important strong principles of law in the Dworkian sense
emerge from that fundamental commitment, important rights that will
trump competing policies. These negative restraints on public action
337. See supra text accompanying notes 106-17.
338. See LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 253-66.
339. Id.; cf. LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 279-316 (discussing reflective under-
standing and meaning of "the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment").
340. See POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JuRIsPRUDENCE, supra note 131, at 423-69.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 214-79.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89, 144-86.
343. MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATIoN, supra note 9, at 159.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 226-40.'
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reflect our understanding of the basics of human relations345 and those
things -that a government should not do because they are destructive
of human relations and liberty in any society,346 or in our society be-
cause of its history, customs, and structure. We develop that under-
standing empirically or experientially through our growing knowledge
of the world, through the commonsense process of rubbing elbows
with our fellows-what Lonergan calls the self-correcting process of
learning through living 47--and through vital personal and societal ex-
periences such as the Holocaust or witnessing human suffering or op-
pression. The development of such basic principles or commitments is
part of the human search and thus part of the search of the authentic
judge. Lonergan would contend that ultimately one develops and ap-
propriates basic horizons348 in which one grasps, with an understand-
ing that is not readily revisable, certain fundamental structures of the
human mind in its search for knowledge and certain fundamental val-
ues. These values emerge from our relations with our fellows and our
commitment to deep respect and concern for them.349
Thus the authentic judge, sorting out his world in a continuing
effort to understand and to relate to persons, will frame theories about
law and about the role of the judge and will recognize important
human commitments and ideals, some of which will emerge as signifi-
cant legal principles. Hopefully, the searching judge will stumble
across and begin to understand the phenomenon of horizons. Hope-
fully the judge will also develop a commitment to cross horizons and
to understand the human relations in foreign contexts. Recognizing
that his decisions always are made within horizons and that he has the
ability to cross horizons, he may avoid overly rigid development and
application of legal theories and principles.
The personalist judge is one who engages in the search just de-
scribed and in the course of that search recognizes himself as person
and those who appear before him as persons. He understands law and
the legal decision-making process as a means for relating persons.
350
He develops a commitment to deep respect and concern for each per-
345. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 119 (1993).
346. Md
347. See LoNERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 173-244, 298; TRACY, supra note 10, at
113-23.
348. See TRACY, supra note 10, at 19-21.
349. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8, at 596, 658-59; LONEROAN, METHODS IN
THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 237-44; TRACY, supra note 10, at 191, 237.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 66-77.
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son.351 Beyond that, he may develop or accept the theories and un-
derstandings of law presented in this Article. His commitment to
persons and his understanding of law will require him to justify his
decisions to himself and to others and provide some of the means and
context for justification.
B. Justification: In General
In the common law dispute settlement process it is customary for
a judge to write an opinion justifying his decision. A classic form of
common law justification is to show that this decision is consistent
with previous decisions. After recognizing that continuing common
law tradition, one also must acknowledge a variety of views regarding
the use of previous authority ranging from the Langdellian closed log-
ical system352 and the Dworkian insistence on rigorous, principled
consistency353 to the legal realist emphasis on leeways354 and the crits'
demonstration of the radical open texture of law. 55 Even Duncan
Kennedy, however, would prefer to justify his decisions by good legal
argument.35 6 The American pragmatist tradition, and perhaps the
common law, historically would recognize the importance of assessing
the consequences of a decision and its impact on people, the economy,
and the felt necessities of the time.3 57 Llewellyn or Fuller would jus-
tify a decision in terms of its pertinence to the reciprocal relations
between persons in a situation.358 Dworkin would rest the justifica-
351. See supra text accompanying notes 258-64.,
352. See TWINING, supra note 86, at 10-26; see also WILLIAM M. WIECEK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A MODERNIZING SocIErY: THE UNITED STATES, 1803 TO 1917
59 (1985). Wiecek states:
Formalism was not so much a coherent jurisprudential philosophy as a set of as-
sumptions about the way human society functioned. Formalist judges sought to
achieve justice by abstracting the essential legal relationship from all the human
circumstances of a case and impersonally applying existing law... undistorted by
human bias or prejudice.
353. See DwoxaCN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 25, at 225-76.
354. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 85, at 62-120; cf LLEWELLYN,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 189, at 215-29 (arguing that judge should first decide case with
layman's view of situation and then go back and "tidy-up" precedents),
355. See Horwitz, supra note 71, at 1036-39; see also Tishnet, An Essay on Rights, supra
note 139 (arguing liberal rights theory indeterminate and culturally based).
356. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 518-27.
357. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons, and Horizons, supra note 13, at 247-53; see also
DONNELLY, TrE LANGUAGE AND USES OF RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 11-17, 24-27, 32-46
(discussing rights as goals, claims, resources, and rhetoric).
358. See Donnelly, Principles, Persons,.and Horizons, supra note 13, at 233,237,244-53;
see also LON FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW, supra note 67 at 59-61, 86-96 (noting that
adjudicatory law, in contrast to statutory law, is made in context of complex human affairs,
with emphasis on case-specific facts); LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 189, at
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tions offered by Judge Hercules, at least in part, on ideals or funda-
mental moral commitments. 59
In this Article an argument has been made that some of these
forms of justification can and should be reconciled. A personalist
judge with a commitment to deep respect and concern for all persons
and with the understanding of the common good described above
must be concerned with the reciprocal relations between persons in
situations, the impact of his decisions on particular persons and on
society in general, and the felt necessities of the time.36 ° He is con-
cerned with these issues precisely because of his fundamental commit-
ment to each person, his ideals, and his understanding of the common
good. He would reject along with Holmes, Llewellyn, and perhaps the
crits, overly rigid understandings of common law precedent.3 61 Never-
theless, deep principle and an interpretation of law and society would
lie behind and support his decisions and their construction of prece-
dent. His respect for persons extends to his fellow judges and the at-
torneys who appear before him. Like Kennedy, he would want to
support his decisions by good legal argument out of respect for his
fellow lawyers.3 62 His opinion is a tool of legal persuasion, a participa-
tion in that ongoing argument about what society should be that con-
stitutes society.
A key personalist understanding is that we have limited knowl-
edge and understanding; our decisions are made within horizons.
That view is widely shared by current commentators of law.363 Be-
cause of our limited knowledge and understanding, an attack may be
made on justification in general or on particular forms of justification.
For example, neo-pragmatists in general, and particularly Judge Pos-
ner, would attack various traditional forms of legal justification. 6 To
rely solely or primarily on legal argument or ordinary legal reasoning
to justify a decision is to believe mistakenly, or pretend, that law is
self-contained and to fail to recognize that it is a set of artificial con-
215-22 (arguing that judges make decisions by analysing particular case facts and fitting
case facts into "type-situation," or set of interpersonal relationships involved in case).
359. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHMrs SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 86-116.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 242-79.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
362. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 518-29.
363. See generally id. (discussing problem faced by judge when law conflicts with result
favored by judge); POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 131, at 148-57
(finding consequences never irrelevant in law and judicial choices are often based on per-
sonal values).
364. See POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 131.
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structs.365 Judges, given the time constraints on their decision making
and the limitations of their knowledge, are not equipped accurately or
even quasi-accurately to assess the consequences of their decisions in
economic or social terms. In any event, many neo-pragmatists would
reject generalizations and therefore principle, and most would reject
overarching theory as sufficient grounds for justifying a decision.3s
A personalist comment on that attack could begin by recognizing
that judges are part of a public dispute settlement institution that ex-
ists for a variety of purposes, including keeping the peace. Some, but
not rigid, consistency is important for coordination within the system
and preserving sufficient clarity in the law to allow people to adhere to
it and to bring their disputes to court for settlement.3 67 The common
law use of precedent serves this function, as well as several others.
Among other traditional functions it promotes intellectual argument
in society about what society should be.36 Traditional respect for pre-
cedent as described, for example, by Holmes in the Common Law or
by Llewellyn in the Common Law Tradition would be sufficient to
facilitate those functions. Following Lonergan, one could describe law
as a commonsense intellectual method which more or less adequately
serves certain purposes.3 69 Most of us think that the law is, to some
extent, inadequate both as a method and in a number of its particular
positions. Nevertheless, it has generally fulfilled its traditional pur-
poses, including keeping the peace, and no rival is in view. One im-
provement in judicial decision-making method would be better use of
the social sciences and other tools for assessing the consequences of
decisions. This improvement should not be overlooked by a personal-
ist judge concerned with the persons who suffer the impact of his deci-
sions.370 Recognizing his time constraints as well as his limited
knowledge and understanding, the personalist judge should acknowl-
edge the inadequacy of his assessment of consequences.371 An impor-
tant improvement would be greater coordination between appellate
judges and scholars, including economists, sociologists, and law
365. Id. at 220-44.
366. See, e.g., id.; RxciiARu A. POSNER, LAw AND LrruTRE: A MISUNDERSTOOD
RELATION (1988).
367. See L.wEu.LN, THE COMMON LAw, supra note 85, at 75-117.
368. Id.; see also DONNELLY, THn LAN GUAGE AND USES OF RIGHrS, supra note 20, at
43-46 (arguing that rights-talk is rhetorical tool used by communities when debating what
society should be); WHrrT, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 72, at 225 (stating language of law
defines community's self-perception).
369. See TRAcY, supra note 10, at 113-20.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
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professors concerned with those fields. Judges could make predictions
about the impact of their decisions, which could be reviewed over
time in the scholarly literature. The law could then be revised judi-
cially or legislatively in view of the consequences. This process would
not produce anything resembling mathematically correct answers and
in many respects would remain, unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, a per-
sonalist judge, because of his commitment to persons, should make
that effort to improve his method and justification of his decisions.
Often intellectual method produces not certainty but emergent
probability of higher or lower degrees. Concern for consequences,
even if our ability to assess them produces low emergent probability,
is important for justifying decisions to people by one concerned with
persons. Likewise, subject to important overriding principles, particu-
larly those protecting significant human rights, a personalist judge
must be concerned with the context of the dispute before him and
with the reciprocal relations between persons in that situation.72 His
ability to understand the situation will be confined by his horizons but
enhanced by his use of techniques for crossing horizons.373 He should
recognize his limited horizons but should be committed to crossing
horizons? 4 His efforts to do so are part of the justification for a deci-
sion by one concerned with persons to the people affected by his deci-
sion. Those who would reject all considerations not arising from the
immediate context of decisions would find this analysis inadequate, as
would those who insist on rigid, principled justification. Those who
recognize our limited but genuine ability to acquire knowledge and
understanding with emergent probability would, perhaps, find this
form of justification either adequate or necessary as a means of ex-
plaining one's decision to persons affected by it and to whom one has
a commitment of respect and concern.
In White's terms, such decisions would be part of the ongoing
argument about society which constitutes society.37 5 The telling of
stories is also an important part of society's discussion and an impor-
tant means for crossing horizons. Narration, whether before juries, as
the statement of facts in appellate argument, or in judicial decisions,
always has been an important aspect of law and is becoming increas-
ingly important.3 76 When law is considered as a means for relating
372. See supra text accompanying notes 242-49, 258-62.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 154-68.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
375. See WHrr, HRAcLEs' Bow, supra note 72, at ix-xvi.
376. James Boyd white goes so far as to claim that, "[w]hoever controls our languages
has the greatest power of all." James Boyd White, Law and Literature: "No Manifesto", 39
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persons, the role of narration in law and in justification of judicial de-
cisions becomes an important means of relating to persons through
the sharing of human experience. The totality of a judge's opinion-
both the statement of facts and the legal argument-could be consid-
ered a narration of the judge's experience in arriving at the deci-
sion.377 Between persons, that sharing of human experience may be
the most fundamental form of justification. Thus, making the opinion
part of, and a partial narration of, the authentic judge's search is the
basic form of personalist justification. In a legal system concerned
with dispute settlement for the sake of keeping the peace, the honest
sharing of human experience would seem to enhance the relation be-
tween persons and contribute to the willingness to use the judicial sys-
tem for the settlement of disputes. What one expects of a judge is a
willingness to listen, to understand the situations before him, to cross
horizons while retaining a commitment to persons, and to high ideals
related to persons. One expects him to struggle with the relationship
between persons and with his fundamental commitments and to ex-
plain that struggle in justifying his decisions.
C. Justification: In Terms of Legitimacy
Duncan Kennedy, in Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, offers a shrewd political assessment of the
importance of legitimacy.378 In justifying decisions he would make as
an imaginary judge, Kennedy would attempt to offer good legal argu-
ments for the sake of gaining and retaining legitimacy power.379 To
the extent that a judge can justify decisions by good legal argument,
he will be able to make his decisions survive appellate review and gain
acceptance with future judges s8 When he is unable to justify his de-
cisions by good legal argument, he expects to lose legitimacy power.
Consequently, his decisions may not stick on appeal and may not be
accepted by future judges.381 In addition, his power to make future
decisions that will stick and promote his political ideology will be di-
MERCER L. REv. 739, 747 (1988); see also JAMES BoYI WHrE, WHEN WoRDs LoSE
THEIR MEANNG (1984) (discussing law as literary art which creates community through
language).
377. See West, Jurisprudence as Narrative, supra note 321, at 145-47; see generally
JAMEs B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 757-63 (1973) (explaining that lawyers must
have "a social and narrative imagination, a capacity to envision different versions of the
future").
378. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 528-30.
379. Id. at 544-45.
380. Id.
381. Id.
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minished.382 In contrast, when he is able to support a pacemaking
decision by good legal argument and make it stick, he gains legitimacy
power and, hence, the ability to command respect for future dramatic
decisions . 83 Kennedy also offers nonpolitical reasons for basing opin-
ions on good legal arguments. These reasons include the wisdom he
acquires from previous decisions and the promise he believes he has
made upon becoming a judge-to offer good legal argument for
decisions.384
A personalist judge, while recognizing Kennedy's political wis-
dom, would emphasize and develop the nonpolitical reasons Kennedy
offers for maintaining the legitimacy of his decisions. The respect
which the personalist judge owes to persons in general, and to each
individual person in particular, requires him to offer reasons for his
decisions that would be recognized as legitimate or which would be
grounded in legitimacy. Thus, legitimacy may be defined not merely
as being in accord with law but as capable of appearing reasonable to
those governed by the decision. Offering legitimate reasons for one's
decision recognizes the reciprocal relations between the judge as a
representative of government and the members of society. Decisions
may appear reasonable to society for a variety of reasons. The judge
may argue that his decision is in accord with the previous decisions or,
perhaps more importantly, with the recognized ways of construing and
interpreting decisions and other authority. The personalist judge,
however, would consider certain forms of appeal to legitimacy as be-
ing especially important.
Particular emphasis would be given as reasons for decisions to
principles and policies grounded significantly in respect and concern
for all persons and for each individual person.3 85 This would be in
accord with the theory of the common good.8 6 Certain principles in
accord with that theory would prevail over competing policies. 38
These principles would be closely related to each individual's primary
social goods.388 Strong rights would be those closely related to protec-
tion of those primary social goods. The personalist judge would ac-
cept the interpretation of democratic government offered by Dworkin
382. Id. at 527-28.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 214-79.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 252-63.
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in chapter 5, "Constitutional Cases," of Taking Rights Seriously.38 9
Under that interpretation our democratic government consists not
merely of majority rule but also of protection for minority rights.39
Allowing strong rights to trump both majority will and strong policies
preserves respect and concern for each person.391 An appeal to this
interpretation of our democratic government is ant appeal to legiti-
macy because the interpretation rests on reasons capable of appearing
reasonable to the American people.
Subject to being overridden by strong principles and policies, rea-
sons based on the reciprocal relations between persons in the situation
before the court would be especially important to the personalist
judge.391 Arguments based on such reciprocal relations would be le-
gitimate because they are capable of appearing reasonable to the par-
ties to the case. Indeed, such reasons may appear particularly
reasonable because use of them demonstrates that the judge has lis-
tened to the parties and attempted to understand their circumstances.
A judge who listens and attempts to understand should appear partic-
ularly legitimate. One of the primary societal expectations of a judge
is an ability and willingness to listen and understand.
A theme which runs through the forms of appeals to legitimacy
which would seem especially important to a personalist judge is re-
spect and concern for persons collectively, individually, and as existing
in concrete circumstances. An argument can be made that grounding
one's decisions in respect and concern for persons is the ultimate ap-
peal to legitimacy; reasons so grounded are especially capable of ap-
pearing reasonable to those affected by them. One must grant that
certain cutting edge decisions grounded in respect and concern for
each person may be out of accord with the current sentiments of soci-
ety and present therefore a particular challenge to the legitimacy
power of the judge who makes them. An example would be the 1772
decision of Lord Mansfield that freed the African slave, James Somer-
set' and as a consequence freed 14,000 or 15,000 other African slaves
in England.393 Mansfield's ultimate justification, after distinguishing
seemingly analogous cases, was that slavery was so contrary to the
basic dignity of human beings that it could not be established by cus-
389. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 131-50.
390. If. at 132-33.
391. Id. at 90-100.
392. See supra text accompanying notes 257-62.
393. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 504 (K.B. 1772).
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tom or case law but only by legislation. 94 That position, which proba-
bly appeared obnoxious to substantial segments of English society39s
at the time, was an appeal to history and to what I would describe as
ultimate legitimacy. Arguably a decision grounded in respect and
concern for each person and for each person's primary social goods or
basic rights is a decision that will be acceptable to subsequent genera-
tions, however obnoxious it appears to present society. A decision
grounded in respect and concern for each person is a decision capable
of appearing reasonable to every person. Such a decision is not only
grounded in basic personalist principles, but is an appeal to ultimate
legitimacy, to principles capable of appearing reasonable to everyone
for generations.
XI. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
This Article has offered a series of related insights which could be
described as a theory of personalism in law or a personalist jurispru-
dence. It presents an outline of certain basic personalist insights and
concepts in an attempt to contribute to the ongoing conversation of
American jurisprudence.396 However, these basic insights and con-
cepts could be perceived as aspects of, or discoveries made in, the
continuing inquiry which is the authentic judge's search.
The personalist judge is one who, in the course of his search, rec-
ognizes himself and those who appear before him as persons.3 9 He
understands law and the legal decision-making process as means for
relating persons.398 Personalism as a legal philosophy is not only com-
mitted to deep respect and concern for all persons but is fascinated
with all aspects of human life, particularly with the multiple contexts
in which persons relate to each other.399 In its piecemeal recovery of a
role for the person in law, American jurisprudence faces a dilemma
that the personalist judge must struggle to resolve. This dilemma is
the apparent conflict between principles as ideals grounded in the
commitment to afford all persons deep respect and concern and, flow-
ing from that commitment, the need to listen to persons, understand
their situations and relationships in context and frame a decision that
394. Id. at 510.
395. See C.H.S. FFooT, LORD MANSFIELD 41-42 (1936).
396. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 42-43.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 52-63.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65, 186-87.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 187-213.
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reflects that understanding. In the effort to frame and justify his deci-
sions, the judge will develop a method for judicial decision making.
Hopefully, in doing so, the judge will choose from various aspects of
extant methods which reflect commitment to and concern for persons.
Personalist thought, drawing upon Macmurray's personalism
4
and Lonergan's critique of method,401 offers a means for assessing ju-
dicial decision-making method. To the extent that a particular under-
standing of judicial method overlooks the judge as person or fails to
focus upon persons and their relations in the situation before the
court, that understanding of method is less satisfactory. In contrast, a
method is more satisfactory to the extent that it emphasizes the role of
persons.402 Dworkin's concern for political friendship and his funda-
mental principle-afford all persons equal respect and concern4 m
from the perspective of a personalist critique of method are important
contributions to the recovery of a role for the person in law. Corre-
spondingly, however, his insistence on rigorous logical development of
principles without a concern for context or for impact on persons is a
major oversight, a significant flaw in his method.4°4 The legal realist
discovery of insight, which Llewellyn called situation sense and Frank
called the gestalt, is a high point in'the recovery of a role for the per-
son in law and in the development of method.40 5 The introspective
analysis necessary to recognition of insight implies that the judge is a
person.4°w The perception of patterns and the interrelations between
persons in the situation before the court, which is the essence of situa-
tion sense, links the judge's understanding of himself as a person with
his understanding of others as persons.' 7 To the extent that a judge
understands himself as a person he is more likely to recognize that
others are persons.40 8 A method in which insight into the relation-
ships between persons in the situation before the judge is central is
400. See supra text accompanying notes 52-58, 219-41.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 106-10.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206; see also DwoRxn', TAKING RIGHTS
SERI6USLY, supra note 25, at ii, 180-83 (discussing Rawls's theory that people have right to
-equal respect and concern in design of political institutions).
404."See supra text accompanying notes 204-06; see also DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs
SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 274-77 (discussing how fundamental liberties could be pro-
tected by either strong protection or principle of equality); Donnelly, Principles, Persons,
and Horizons, supra note 13, at 163-65, 247-53 (criticizing Dworkin's analysis of judicial
methodology and relating Dworkin's views to those of other legal scholars).
405. See supra text accompanying notes 78-105.
406. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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developed for the sake of action, the judge's decision through which
he is related to others and promotes the relationship between
persons. 4o9
Recognition that those relationships in a complex society are
often necessarily indirect leads a judge in his ongoing search and in-
quiry to a consideration of theories and principles of justice.410 A per-
sonalist theory of the common good has been offered in this Article.
Society should be perceived as comprised of persons acting to-
gether.4 11 Actions which tend to destroy the common action or to
eliminate or seriously inhibit the participation of any individual in the
common action are contrary to the common good.412 From this basic
set of insights, a theory of rights may be developed after a considera-
tion of basic goods-those goods necessary to participation in the
common action. Strong rights are those directly related to the basic
goods, while weak rights are other reasons for decisions related to the
individual claims.413 Among the weak rights are the normal legal
rights based on precedent and other authority which Dworkin so
strongly insists upon.414 Weak rights must be considered by a judge
but do not automatically trump important policies. In contrast, strong
rights related to the basic goods normally would trump even major
policies.415 This theory allows both staunch protection of fundamental
rights and policy decision making by judges to promote the common
action. In addition, it allows the flexibility in law necessary to listen
and respond to persons in context while adhering to fundamental
rights.
A judge who reflects on his human situation will recognize his
limited knowledge and understanding and the phenomenon which
Lonergan describes as horizons. 416 His commitment to persons and
his need to listen to and understand them should lead to development
of horizon-crossing and transcending techniques as an important as-
pect of his decision-making method. 1 7 He also should recognize that
the theories which he develops, including his theory of the basic
409. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27, 140-43.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 232-41.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68, 273-79.
413. See supra text accompanying notes 264-68.
414. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 25, at 89-114.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 264-67.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 144-56.
417. See LONEROAN, METHOD IN TimOLOGY, supra note 85, at 251.
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goods, while important and helpful, are framed within horizons4 18
For this reason, and because of his commitment to persons, he should
be continually open to further development of his theory, especially
through conversation across horizons in a pluralist society, a society
composed of multiple horizons.41 9 Law, as the ongoing argument
about what society should be that helps constitute society and is an
important aspect of our common action, is a major vehicle for that
conversation. The authentic judge contributes to that conversation
and justifies his decisions by an honest sharing of his experience, in-
cluding his struggle and search in arriving at his conclusions.
This Article, then, has offered a series of related insights as a con-
tribution to the grand conversation of American jurisprudence. The
basic concepts and insights could be described as a theory of personal-
ism. The reader, however, need not accept the entire theory. In the
tradition of Lonergan, one could extract those insights which appeal
and develop them as part of one's own theory. The basic concepts and
insights of a personalist jurisprudence could be perceived as discover-
ies during the search of an authentic judge. Before closing the Article,
however, other contexts for the personalist insights should be consid-
ered, particularly that of one engaged in doing jurisprudence. There
should be a brief concluding segment on how to do personalist
jurisprudence.
B. How To Do Personalist Jurisprudence
Personalist jurisprudence should be an expression of a scholar's
own exploration and search as well as an effort to participate in the
ongoing conversation of American jurisprudence. While one could
usefully develop further the theory of personalism in law offered in
this Article one also could develop other understandings of the rela-
tionships of persons to law. One could adapt further the monumental
work of Lonergan to a further understanding of law and legal
method.4' David Granfield began that process and his work could be
mined for further insights.42 ' Or one could draw on multiple non-
legal authors of the rich personalist literature available.4'
418. See supra text accompanying notes 273-79.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 278-79.
420. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 8; LONERGAN, METHOD m THEOLOGY, supra
note 8.
421. See GRANFmLD, supra note 76.
422. See GwmmTH, supra note 4; HARINo, TRE CHRISTIAN ExasTErNIALIsr, supra note
6; HARING, FREE AND FArIHFUL IN CHRIST, supra note 6; LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note
8; LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8; MACMURRAY, PERSONS IN RELA-
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American jurisprudence over the twentieth century, as Granfield
points out, has engaged in a piecemeal recovery of a role for the per-
son in law.4' One can participate in that grand conversation by locat-
ing and bringing forward various aspects of the person in law, perhaps
as emphasized by one important thinker or another. Lonergan's
method of recognizing and promoting insights in other theories, which
he calls advancing positions and reversing counter-positions, would be
helpful here.4' One, then, can engage in a personalist conversation
with Rawls, Dworkin, Posner, Kennedy, Unger, the critical legal stud-
ies movement in general, with feminism and with critical race theory.
Indeed, one could engage heavily in law and economics, feminism,
critical legal studies, law and literature, or critical race theory while
emphasizing the personalist aspects of the thought one is exploring.
In doing so, indeed, in engaging in any jurisprudential conversation, it
would of course, be important to be aware of the impact of one's
thought on persons and their relationships, to be conscious of the phe-
nomenon of horizons and of the perception of theories of the good
within horizons.4' Recognizing the importance of crossing horizons
and understanding and protecting rights as perceived within foreign
horizons is more critical when one is developing an ideologically sup-
ported full theory of the good. Carrying forward the conversation
with other thinkers and schools of thought is perhaps the most signifi-
cant way of doing personalist jurisprudence while contributing to the
development of American thought.
A particularly attractive aspect of some recent theories is the rec-
ognition of oppression and the desire to restructure areas of substan-
tive law to relieve oppression.426 A lawyer or judge inspired by
personalism may find such restructuring not only an appropriate but a
necessary activity. The jurisprudence of any particular field of law,
such as criminal justice, could be described as a reflection on the fun-
damental aspects of that field in relation to one's ongoing reflection
on law and human experience. Personalist reflection on the funda-
TION, supra note 9; MACMURRAY, THE SELF As AOENT, supra note 9; WorrLA, supra
note 7.
423. See GRANF ELD, supra note 76, at 29-36.
424. See LONEROAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 8, at 251.
425. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89, 97-101, 273-79.
426. See, e.g., MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Matsuda, supra note 75, at 2320; Robin L. West, The
Differences in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 WIs. WoMEN's LJ. 81 (1987); cf. Donnelly, A Theory of Justice, supra note 252
(discussing individual rights approach to capital punishment cases as alternative to
majoritarian approach).
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mental structure and restructuring of particular fields of law, such as
criminal justice, may be an important means for understanding and
correcting the oppression resulting from that field's current structure.
The discussion, then, in this Article of the basic concepts and in-
sights of a personalist jurisprudence is not only a beginning but also a
contribution to many possible conversations and explorations.
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